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SUMMARY 
The Korean irrigation project, to which A . I . D .  contributed $25.7 
million beginning in September 1974, had as its goal assisting Korea to 
become self-sufficient in rice and barley and raising farm household 
income in project areas by $412 annually. These targets were to be 
achieved through the construction of "up to 66" irrigation works of 
various types. The project was part of a major continuing program by the 
Korean government to expand irrigation of paddy and improve the gross 
discrepancies between urban and rural income, the latter having lagged as 
planning concentrated on industrial and export-oriented development. 
Korea today has virtually 100 percent irrigation to some degree on paddy 
land. This and other factors have made the Korean farmer the most 
productive rice farmer in the world per hectare. 
Fifty-five projects were completed with A I D  funds. Rice self- 
sufficiency was achieved by 1975, soon after the project agreement was 
signed. Thus, the project made only a marginal contribution to that end, 
but it will positively contribute to sustaining self-sufficiency. The 
project did not help achieve improved barley production, which has been 
declining steadily due to the very high government rice support price and 
the growing demand for wheat in urban areas. Farmers' incomes did rise by 
the specified amount on most farms, given the rice support price, but 
income levels in rural Korea are directly correlated with farm size; thus 
the project has affected beneficiaries unevenly in spite of an effective 
land reform. Average rice yields in project sites increased 2.0 metric 
tons per hectare, or 1 metric ton on the average farm of one-half hectare. 
Overall the project was successful in improving yields of rice. The 
project was a single-focused effort on irrigation alone, and did not 
require any technical assistance. Its success was dependent upon a 
complex of other factors that were in place, including a high degree of 
engineering and administrative competence, delivery of extension services, 
agricultural inputs. and a high rice procurement price (more than double 
world prices). The projects are economically replicable and sustainable 
at the Korean rice price and would be viable if both international input 
and output prices prevailed in Korea. They are also economically possible 
because of a variety of sunk costs in previous construction and social 
infrastructures. 
Farmers have shown an acute awareness of market forces and are tied 
into the urban economy because of improved transportation, education, and 
information. This is evidenced by the production of winter vegetables, 
which has become a major rural industry. 
The success of the project was achieved with little decision-making 
participation by the rural population, which is mobilized into a variety 
of organizations each of which demand time, money, and labor without 
commensurate meaningful involvement in planning. Farm Land Improvement 
Associations are not cooperatives, but bureaucratic means by which to 
deliver water and collect fees. They are very efficient. 
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Wonen were not mentioned i n  the pro jec t  design,  and have experienced 
both gains and losses .  They have shared i n  g r e a t e r  household income, but 
now have a g r e a t e r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  workload due t o  new c u l t i v a t i o n  methods 
while continuing very labor- intensive housework. More chi ldren  a r e  going 
t o  school,  and t h e i r  labor p a r t i c i p a t i o n  has declined. 
I r r i g a t i o n  r e c i p i e n t s  view t h e i r  l i v e s  as  having improved with 
i r r i g a t i o n ,  although t h a t  a lone  was not the  s i n g l e  causa t ive  f ac to r .  With 
increased income, add i t iona l  education becomes the f i r s t  p r i o r i t y  of t h e  
f ami l i e s ,  with t h e  purchase of household amenities second. Improved 
n u t r i t i o n  i s  not regarded a s  of importance. Education i s  viewed a s  an 
avenue of s o c i a l  and physical  mobi l i ty ,  enabling the r e c i p i e n t  t o  leave 
the farm f o r  urban employment. Farmers do not want t l le i r  ch i ldren  t o  
fol low i n  t h a t  occupation. 
This r e s u l t s  i n  an o v e r a l l  aging of the  farm population, and has 
important implicat ions fo r  the fu tu re  of the  r u r a l  sector .  A prolonged 
i n d u s t r i a l  recess ion ,  which Korea may a l ready have entered,  could bring 
nunbers of migrating youth back t o  the  v i l l a g e s  a s  urban jobs a r e  reduced; 
these a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be the  l e a s t  educated, and the l e a s t  en t repreneur ia l .  
This recession could mean t h e  Korean government w i l l  l i k e l y  be under 
pressure  t o  lower the  support p r i ce  of r i c e .  The Korean farmer i s  
dependent on "high technology" farm p r a c t i c e s ,  including powered equipment 
and heavy use of purchased inputs .  Since the average farm s i z e  i s  very 
small,  and consequently t o t a l  production per farm i s  low, i t  i s  doubtful  
t h a t  the  government's pol icy t o  use urban t o  r u r a l  t r a n s f e r  payments t o  
equal ize  r u r a l  and urban incomes f o r  small farmers w i l l  continue t o  be 
successfu l  i f  urban incones continue t o  grow. 
Good water c o n t r o l  and successfu l  i r r i g a t i o n  provide a  means t o  
increase and s t a b i l i z e  the  l e v e l s  of farm production. I r r i g a t i o n  can be 
c o s t  e f f e c t i v e  under c e r t a i n  condi t ions ,  but such condit ions i n  general  
a r e  scarce ,  and becoming scarcer .  
Po l lu t ion  of i r r i g a t i o n  water,  which i s  used f o r  washing and some- 
times f o r  drinking may be becoming an i ssue  needing study. Thought should 
be given t o  use of some of the more t r a d i t i o n a l  though improved r i c e  
s t r a i n s  t h a t  a r e  l e s s  suscep t ib le  t o  disease.  
Korean r u r a l  development, which includes i r r i g a t i o n  but a l s o  
encompasses r e f o r e s t a t i o n ,  cooperat ives and the  Sae-maul (New Vi l lage)  
Movement, a s  wel l  a s  high p r i ce  supports ,  has been successfu l  i n  the  
Korean context.  Its r e l i a n c e  on the a v a i l a b i l i t y  of o ther  inputs ,  t h e  
sunk c o s t s  i n  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ,  t h e  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  nature of decision-making 
and lack  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  and the  unequal bene f i t s  t o  women, preclude i t  
a s  a  model f o r  A I D  programming. 
A s  "North" count r ies  have been exhorted t o  provide g r e a t e r  support t o  
"South" na t ions  f o r  mutual b e n e f i t s ,  so within a  country the  urban s e c t o r  
may have t o  support the r u r a l  population f o r  increased food production and 
na t iona l  pol icy reasons i n  cases  where i r r i g a t i o n  may not be economic i n  
the  shor t  term. 
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The remarkable progress that Korea has made in industrial growth and 
export earnings has sometimes overshadowed important developments that 
have occurred in rural areas. Rural improvement has been relatively 
recent, but it has been rapid, although not without problems that may 
intensify. An element of that growth has been the massive expansion of 
irrigation systems, so that today about 100 percent of Korean paddy land 
is irrigated to some degree. 
This project, to which the United States Government contributed $25.7 
million, was a small element in the gradual transformation of rural Korea. 
It has helped spur growth in those enclaves where such systems were built. 
It essentially funded Korean-designed systems, offering no new technologi- 
cal or administrative support. The major credit for rural change must go 
to aspects of Korean nacro-economic policy and administration. The team, 
driving some 2,300 kilometers in 8 provinces, visited over 27 percent of 
the project sites, representing 38 percent of the total hectarage irriga- 
ted (see Appendix A). 
This impact evaluation team was composed of two A.I.D. staff, an 
outside British consultant, and a Korean sociologist. The comments in the 
main report should be attributed to the team alone; certain appendices 
were the products of single individuals. The team wishes to thank Mr. 
Shim Jae-woong and Ms. Chung Dok-ae, translators, who both were invaluable 
associates and pleasant companions. Mr. Lee Sung-gun of USAID was a 
welcome addition in our field work. 
Most importantly, the team wishes to express its deep appreciation to 
the many dozens of Korean men and women farmers living in the irrigated 
areas visited. They took time from their onerous tasks and obligations to 
talk frankly with us, and their hospitality and warmth made our too brief 
visit most enjoyable. Our thanks go also to those Korean government 
officials at the w a n d  level who guided us and provided us with a 
great deal of data from their voluminous records. The U.S. Embassy and 
A.I.D. Mission were most helpful and cooperative in supplying logistical 
and typing support. 
PROJECT DATA SHEET 
Project Title: Irrigation Project - Korea 
A.I.D. Project Number: 489-0706 
A.I.D. Loan Number: 489-T-090 
Borrower: The Government of the Republic of Korea. The project was 
implemented by the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
Loan Amount: Total $25.7 million. 
Original: $17.2 million. Loan Agreement signed September 11, 1974. 
First Amendment: $6.5 million. Amendment signed April 30, 1975. 
Second Amendment: $2 million. Amendment signed September 13, 1975. 
Korean Contribution $6.425 million 
Total Project Costs: $32,125 million* 
Terms: 40 years repayment from the date of the first disbursement, 
including 10 year grace period. Interest rate of 2 percent per annum for 
10 years after the first disbursement and at a rate of 3 percent per annum 
thereafter. 
Terminal Date for Request for Reimbursement and for Disbursement: 
March 11, 1978. 
Purpose: To assist accelerating ROK efforts to expand the production of 
rice and barley through the utilization of water resources in up to 66 
small/medium scale irrigation projects and thereby assist up to 
approximately 95,000 farmers to increase their net incomes by an average 
of $412 per year. 
Accomplishments: Completion of 55 irrigation systems in the 7 provinces 
of mainland Korea. 
*~hese figures do not include sunk costs; i.e., construction costs 
incurred before the project was approved. All projects had been started 
earlier. This total cost of the 55 irrigation systems is much higher. 
GLOSSARY 
ADC 
Chongbo 
FLIA 
Gama 
-
Gun 
Gunsu 
Ichang 
MAF 
Myon 
Myonchang 
NACF 
ORD 
Agricultural Development Corporation, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries. 
Unit of measurement, approximately equal to one 
hectare. 
Farm Land Improvement Association: a 
government-sponsored and controlled water users 
association. 
A unit of volume, equal to 80 kg. of milled rice or 54 
kg. of paddy. 
County; 140 throughout the country. 
County chief, appointed by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs. 
(Yichang, Lichang, or Rheechang) village head. 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
Township; a part of a 
Township head; appointed on authority of the governor. 
National Agricultural Cooperative Federation; a 
government-sponsored means to provide agricultural 
inputs, credit, and assist in government grain 
procurement, storage, and marketing. 
Office of Rural Development, Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries. 
Paddy Unhusked rice. 
Pyong Unit of land measurement; 36 sq. feet; 3,000 pyong 
equal one chongbo or hectare. 
ROK Republic of Korea. 
Sae-maul Undong "New Village Movement", or "New Community Movement", a 
government-controlled rural development activity. 
Sae-Maum Undong "New Heart (or mind) Movement". The ideological 
equivalent of the New Village Movement; designed to 
instill traditional Confucian virtues and ideological 
conformity and obedience. Similar to the Chinese New 
Life Movement in the 1930s. 
Note on Korean Romanization 
The Korean Government has adopted a system of romanization that 
neither approximates the Korean equivalent nor is useful for English 
speakers. Additionally, it has changed traditionally accepted Korean 
place-name spellings. In this paper the modified McCune-Reischauer system 
without diacritical marks is used, as preferred in some academic journals. 
Appendix J gives the Chinese characters for all sites selected, as well as 
their locations. 
v i i  
South Korea 
@ National Capital 
Cities 
- Major Roads 
E Sites visited 
(see Appendix J for site names) 
I. PROJECT SETTING 
A t  t he  IBRD-sponsored Korean Donor Group Meeting i n  December 1972, 
the  Korean government formally requested a s s i s t a n c e  from the  world 
community f o r  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of support t o  Korean i r r i g a t i o n .  Already 
widespread, i r r i g a t i o n  was par t  of a complex s t r a t e g y  f o r  r u r a l  growth 
t h a t  had i t s  o r i g i n s  i n  the  p o l i t i c a l  and economic mil ieu of the  e a r l i e r  
two years. 
I n  economic terms, Korea i n  1972 was changing rapidly. Korean 
exports ,  which were a token $55 mi l l ion  i n  1962, reached $1.7 b i l l i o n  by 
1972. Industry had climbed from 9.1 percent of the  GNP t o  21.1 percent  
over t h a t  decade. Urban incomes were double those of a decade before,  and 
the  GNP had begun i t s  spectacular  climb, averaging 8.7 percent annual 
growth by t h a t  year. However, a g r i c u l t u r e  a s  a percentage of n a t i o n a l  
income had dropped from 35.6 t o  24.2 percent. I n d u s t r i a l  progress 
r e f l ec ted  na t iona l  economic po l i c i e s  and p r i o r i t i e s  of the  f i r s t  two 
Five-Year Plans (1962-1971). 
The r u r a l  s e c t o r ,  however, had been neglected. Agricul ture had grown 
annually by 3.8 percent between 1959-1969, although indus t ry  burgeoned a t  
8.2 percent. Rural neglect  was dramat ica l ly  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  the  presiden- 
t i a l  e l e c t i o n  of 1971, which Pres ident  Park narrowly won, but with g r e a t l y  
reduced r u r a l  support. This  marginal v i c to ry  caused deep governmental 
concern. Changes i n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  pol icy ,  a l ready i n  process, were 
accelerated.  
Extefnal  f a c t o r s  a l s o  were i n f l u e n t i a l .  I n  1970-1971 the  terms of 
PL 480 support began t o  harden, and r i c e  imports became more of a d r a i n  on 
Korean foreign exchange. (See Appendix F.) I n  1969 a dual  g r a i n  price- 
support system was i n i t i a t e d , ,  providing higher  farm p r i c e s  while sub- 
s i d i z i n g  urban consumers. 
The Third Five-Year Plan (1972-19761, was designed t o  r ed ress  the  
balance between urban and r u r a l  incomes, and i n  1971 the  Sae-maul (New 
Vil lage)  Movement s t a r t ed .  Its o r i g i n s  were a s  much p o l i t i c a l  a s  
economic, providing immediate v i l l a g e  mobil izat ion t o  support the  r u r a l  
emphasis of t h e  Plan. 
Farmers i n  1972 were poor. The annual income of farming fami l i e s  of 
over s i x  persons rose from $421 i n  1965 t o  $702 i n  1970 i n  current  terms, 
but the  consumer pr ice  index had almost doubled. I n d u s t r i a l  growth had 
esca la ted  urban income almost twice a s  f a s t  a s  farm income. Migration t o  
urban a reas  was widespread, a s  both young men and women sought off-farm 
employment. 
I n  1972 Korea had i n s u f f i c i e n t  r i c e  and barley. That year,  $103 
mi l l ion  of r i c e  and $22 .mil l ion of barley were imported. The n a t i o n a l  
plan s t i p u l a t e d  Korea was t o  reach se l f -suf f ic iency i n  these two most 
important s t a p l e  gra ins .  
In s p i t e  of o v e r a l l  adequate annual r a i n f a l l ,  i t s  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i n  
Korea i s  inadequate a t  c r i t i c a l  periods i n  the  growing season. Thus, 
Previous Page Blank 
improved irrigation of the nation's few major river basins and the devel- 
opment of smaller-scale systems in the hills and on small plains were 
means to improve agricultural production and increase farm income. Without 
water control, farmers are subject to the vagaries of drought about once 
every four years. Irrigation is a form of crop insurance, both for the 
farmer by providing stability of income, and for the nation by assuring 
stability of national yields. 
11. THE PROJECT 
At the time of the Donor Group Meeting in 1972, the IBRD was sup- 
porting major river basin development (see Appendix H). A.I.D. agreed to 
consider funding smaller-scale systems. 
The Korean government suggested that A.I.D. support 88 small scale 
irrigation projects on which work had already begun. A.I.D. picked 66 of 
these systems and agreed in May 1974 on a loan of $17.2 million. An 
agreement on this project was signed in Seoul on September 11, 1974. 
Amendments were later signed for $6.5 million and $2 million. Thus, the 
total U.S. contribution was $25.7 million, only a small percentage of 
Korea's total investment in irrigation and rural development. 
The goals of the project were to minimize rice and barley imports and 
increase rural incomes, while the purposes were to improve production of 
rice and barley through irrigation. and simultaneously to raise farm 
income by $412 per year.1 
An anticipated subsidiary benefit was the strengthening of the Farm 
Land Improvement Association (FLIA), a water users' "cooperative" that 
operates under the guidance of the Agricultural Development Corporation 
(ADC) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
The 66 sub-projects that-were picked for support included pumping 
systems, drainage, reservoir construction, and land reclamation. Con- 
struction on all of these projects had already started; some were nearly 
finished. A.I.D. funds hastened the completion of the systems. A.I.D., 
after supplying some initial capital, reimbursed the government for 75 
percent of the costs of each system after it was operational. No 
technical assistance was provided, as the government entities were 
well-staffed and competent. This was a project admirably suited to the 
purposes of both governments. It was in an area of mutual priority, and 
its beneficiaries were appropriate for A.I.D. support. It required little 
monitoring. It was, in effect, a project easy to conceive and to imple- 
ment with the decreasing staff in the A.I.D. Mission. Thus, A.I.D. added 
nothing but funds to a Korean effort. This was a project that the Koreans 
would have completed in any case. It appears that A.I.D. was programming 
l ~ h e  original project paper had no logical framework and no goal 
statement. The first amendment had both, but dropped the dollar figure. 
This paragraph represents an amalgam of both documents. 
na t iona l ly  up to  a prescribed l e v e l  of f i n a n c i a l  support. Nevertheless,  
these  types of i r r i g a t i o n  systems and t h e i r  operat ion in the  context  of 
Korean r u r a l  progress o f f e r  important lessons t o  development planners.  
The policy environment f o r  pro jec t  design was favorable. Government 
r i c e  and barley support p r i ces  and procurement p o l i c i e s  were major induce- 
ments t o  farmers. There was an e f f e c t i v e  and e f f i c i e n t  r u r a l  administra- 
t i o n ,  even i f  au toc ra t i c .  Extension serv ices  reached most r u r a l  a reas ,  
and the  National Agr icu l tu ra l  Cooperative Federat ion (NACF) provided 
information and marketing a s s i s t ance ,  seed, f e r t i l i z e r ,  pes t i c ides ,  
herb ic ides ,  and c r e d i t ,  a s  well  a s  some cash loans. 
The r u r a l  population was changing from a t r a d i t i o n a l  peasantry t o  an 
in t eg ra ted  element of the  na t iona l  scene. Farmers were no longer i so la-  
ted. They were aware of the  market and government po l i c i e s .  Roads had 
improved and r u r a l  t ranspor t  had increased. Farmers had radios,  and were 
soon t o  get te levis ion .  Newspapers c i r cu la t ed  i n  v i l l ages .  Rural i so la-  
t i o n  was dramatical ly and irrevocably broken. 
The f i n a l  disbursements from t h i s  pro jec t  were completed i n  March 
1978,  with complete drawdown of the o r i g i n a l  loan and its two amendments. 
A l l  sub-projects were then i n  operation; some have been working f o r  almost 
s i x  years. Some were completed by December 1974. No formal evalua t ions  
were done on the p ro jec t ,  although i t  had been s tudied  and base l ine  da ta  
co l l ec ted  ( see  Appendix A on methodology). Thus, the  systems a r e  s u i t a b l e  
f o r  impact evaluat ion.  
These i r r i g a t i o n  p ro jec t  s i t e s  a r e  heterogeneous. They e x i s t  i n  ev- 
e ry  mainland province. Some a r e  i n  i s o l a t e d  va l l eys ,  o the r s  c lose  to  ur- 
ban centers .  From 70 t o  over 2,000 hec ta res ,  many s i t e s  a r e  small but 
d i s c r e t e  elements of l a r g e r  systems dependent on previously constructed 
d ikes  or  i r r i g a t i o n  works, some of which a r e  almost f i f t y  years  old. The 
systems a r e  o f t en  soph i s t i ca t ed ,  with some pumps a l t e r n a t i n g  between ir- 
r i g a t i o n  and drainage; some have long aquaducts snaking through the  h i l l s .  
I f  the i r r i g a t i o n  works and t h e i r  l oca t ions  cannot e a s i l y  be categorized,  
the  adminis t ra t ive  systems a r e  standard. A Farm Land Improvement Associ- 
a t i o n  (FLU),  cont ro l led  and operated a s  pa r t  of the government bureaucra- 
cy, i s  the model. This organizat ion s e t s  water f ees ,  c o l l e c t s  payments, 
maintains t h e  systems, and evolves i n t e r n a l  pa t t e rns  f o r  water d i s t r ibu -  
tion. 
The 1974 pro jec t  design d id  not s p e c i f i c a l l y  dea l  with employment, 
migrat ion,  o r  women. It obliquely referenced p a r t i c i p a t i o n  through t h e  
expansion of the FLIAs. Yet these i s sues  a r e  a l l  so germane t o  A.I.D. to- 
day, and were e x p l i c i t l y  of concern a t  the  time of p ro jec t  preparat ion,  
t h a t  they a r e  glven extensive treatment i n  the analys is .  Korean r u r a l  de- 
velopment has been made up of many-faceted, indiv idual  programs re inforc-  
ing  or  complementing each other .  I r r i g a t i o n  has been a necessary, but not 
s u f f i c i e n t ,  means t o  progress, and cannot be considered separa te ly  from 
concommitant development e f f o r t s  or  macro-economic po l i c i e s .  Thus, s eve ra l  
Korean programs w i l l  be discussed i n  t h i s  evaluat ion and its appendices 
This  does not imply t h a t  t h i s  p ro jec t  should have considered a l l  these  
f ac to r s ,  but tha t  t h e  p ro jec t ' s  r e s u l t s  cannot be analyzed without them. 
111. PROJECT IMPACTS: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
A. On-Farm Resul t s  
The p ro jec t  agreement c a l l e d  f o r  support f o r  "up to"  66 i r r i g a t i o n  
systems. Fif ty-f ive sub-projects were completed with A.I.D. funds, and 
a r e  i n  f u l l  operat ion.  The o ther  11 sub-projects a r e  s t i l l  under con- 
s t r u c t i o n  because many were l a r g e r ,  and w i l l  be f in i shed  by the  Korean 
government. The goal of se l f -suf f ic iency i n  r i c e  and bar ley  was achieved 
e s s e n t i a l l y  without p ro jec t  support. By 1975 Korea was s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  
i n  both grains.  The projec t  w i l l ,  however, he lp  s u s t a i n  t h i s  s e l f -  
suf f ic iency,  although d i e t a r y  changes a r e  replacing the importance of 
bar ley  with wheat.2 
Interviews with FLIA o f f i c i a l s  and with farmers and t h e i r  wives 
revealed t h a t  r i c e  y ie lds  and t o t a l  r i c e  production increased s i g n i f i -  
c a n t l y  during 1974-1979. The exception was the  most southern a reas  
a f fec ted  by a typhoon i n  1979 and by b l a s t  d isease  i n  1978. The FLIA 
records show t h a t  the average p ro jec t  a reas  had a y i e l d  increase  of 2.4 
metr ic  tons per hec tare  (mt/ha) a f t e r  f u l l  i r r i g a t i o n ;  t h e  range was 1.5 
t o  3.6 m t l h a  of polished r ice .  Some land, perhaps 10-15 percent ,  changed 
from upland crops of peanuts,  soybeans, and vegetables t o  f u l l y  i r r i g a t e d  
paddy. Those farmers who converted t o  r i c e  maintained they were much 
b e t t e r  of f .  Farmers who grew r i c e  before the p ro jec t  quoted increased 
y ie lds  from 1.2 mt/ha t o  3.3 mt/ha; the  average 2.0 mt/ha. The p r i n c i p a l  
determinant i n  y i e l d  increments was the  condit ion of i r r i g a t i o n  p r i o r  t o  
the  project .  On land of comparable q u a l i t y ,  t o t a l  y i e lds  a r e  now a l l  
wi th in  the range of 4.5 t o  5.0 mtlha. 
The goal  of augmented income of $412 per family was the  equivalent  of 
1.2 metr ic  tons (mt) of r i c e  a t  the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i ce  estimated i n  t h e  
1974 p ro jec t  paper. In  r e t rospec t  t h i s  seems t o  have been a very ambi- 
t i o u s  t a rge t .  With average f a n  s i z e s  f o r  the  p ro jec t  a reas  of only a 
ha l f  hec tare  producing 1.2 m t  before the  p ro jec t ,  t h i s  meant t h a t  produc- 
t i o n  would have t o  increase  by 100 percent.  Average r i c e  production on an 
average-sized farm of one-half hec tare  increased about 1.0 m t .  A t  i n t e r -  
na t iona l  r i c e  p r i ces ,  only the s i g n i f i c a n t l y  larger-than-average farm 
could have reached the  income goal  because farm income i s  so c l e a r l y  a 
funct ion  of farm s ize .  However, even small  farm u n i t s  probably met the  
r a i sed  income t a r g e t  because of the high domestic support p r i c e  f o r  r i ce .  
The Korean Government supported t h e  p r i ce  a t  about $762 i n  1979 agains t  a 
1974-1979 world average of about $360 m t .  
A t  domestic p r i ces ,  a farmer with a half  hec tare  needed only an 
incremental increase  of 0.6 m t  of r i c e  above p r i o r  production of 1.3 m t ,  
n e t  of production cos t s ,  t o  meet income t a rge t s .  Since cu r ren t  t o t a l  
production from a half  hec tare  i s  about 2 t o  2.5 m t ,  it seems h ighly  
probable t h a t  the  t a r g e t  f o r  add i t iona l  income has been met by almost a l l  
owner-operators. Renters ,  who pay owners about half  the  t o t a l  production. 
Z ~ e e  Appendix I f o r  s t a t i s t i c s  on se l f -suf f ic iency r a t i o s  f o r  these 
th ree  grains. 
and who bear most, i f  not a l l ,  production c o s t s ,  appeared t o  be i n  a  very 
precarious pos i t ion ,  i f  they were re ly ing  on r i c e  alone. 
Since r i c e  y ie lds  increased some 50-75 percent ,  and some new r i c e  
lands were brought i n t o  production, the  pro jec t  pos i t ive ly  and e f f e c t i v e l y  
contr ibuted t o  sus ta in ing  na t iona l  r i c e  production goals.  Farm income ob- 
jec t ives  were a l s o  met from r i c e  alone,  with the  exception of the  very 
small and part-time farmers. However, t h i s  holds t r u e  only a t  the  present  
support price. 
The an t i c ipa ted  b e n e f i t s  of bar ley  production t o  na t iona l  c e r e a l  
goals  were not achieved. National ly,  bar ley  production has decl ined from 
a high of 1.8 mi l l ion  m t  i n  1976 t o  an estimated n e a r r e c o r d  low of .8 
mi l l ion  m t  f o r  1980. This past  year,  the pro jec t  a r e a s  have overwhelming- 
l y  q u i t  barley production. I n  the  barley-growing area  of the  survey 
sample, only one v i l l a g e  grew a s i g n i f i c a n t  amount of barley. Secure 
i r r i g a t i o n  water,  a  high r i c e  pr ice  policy,  a  formidable a r r a y  of ava i l -  
a b l e  production inputs ,  a  lessening demand f o r  bar ley  and a r ap id ly  grow- 
ing demand f o r  f r e sh  f a l l ,  winter ,  and spr ing  vegetables encouraged 
farmers t o  concentrate  e f f o r t s  on v iny l  house production of off-season 
vegetables--all  a t  the c o s t  of bar ley ,  a  r e l a t i v e l y  unprof i tab le  crop. 
Winter farming e f f o r t s  a r e  now focused on v inyl  house crops. There is a 
negative e f f e c t  on r i c e  y ie lds  when bar ley  i s  grown; i ts  June matut i ty  
invades on the optimal time f o r  the  r i c e  regime. With the  s e c u r i t y  of ir- 
r i g a t i o n ,  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of o the r  inputs ,  the  high guaranteed r i c e  p r i ce ,  
agronomic and labor c o n s t r a i n t s ,  c e r t a i n  farmers' f i n a n c i a l  a b i l i t y  t o  as- 
sume high r i s k s ,  and the  p o t e n t i a l  high r e tu rns  on v iny l  crops, t he  farm 
family has r a t i o n a l l y  opted out of barley. Farmers not  growing crops 
under v inyl ,  which o f t en  r equ i re s  p r iva te  c r e d i t  a t  high i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  
may simply opt f o r  maximizing re tu rns  t o  r i c e  and l e i s u r e .  Thus, r i s i n g  
consumer incomes allowed a s h i f t  of e f f o r t  toward more rewarding personal ,  
r a t h e r  than na t iona l ,  objec t ives .  
Farmers a r e  now extremely specia l ized  i n  the  production of a l l  crops,  
i n  par t  because of i r r i g a t i o n  and l imi ted  a r a b l e  land,  but more gene ra l ly  
because of g r e a t e r  t o t a l  demand f o r  a  widening market. Korean a g r i c u l t u r e  
is small s c a l e  but "high technology" oriented. Very heavy dosages of 
f e r t i l i z e r  and numerous pes t  con t ro l  t reatments  a r e  evident .  Steel-framed 
vinyl  houses a r e  abundant. T i l l e r s ,  and a wide v a r i e t y  of power sprayers ,  
power pumps and powered t r anspor t  a r e  equally widespread. The i r r i g a t i o n  
systems a r e  l a rge ly  and c r i t i c a l l y  dependent upon d i e s e l  o r  e l e c t r i c  
driven i r r i g a t i o n  and drainage pumps. While s t r i v i n g  f o r  se l f -suf f ic iency 
i n  c e r e a l s ,  the  farming community has become heavily dependent upon 
imported sources of energy f o r  i r r i g a t i o n  and farming, s ince  the na t ion  
has no petroleum. Import dependence i s  a l s o  high f o r  intermediate goods 
used i n  the  manufacture of farm production inputs.  
This  pro jec t  was focused on the  de l ive ry  of a  s i n g l e  c r i t i c a l  
f a c t o r w a t e r .  It b a s i c a l l y  succeeded where many s imi la r  p ro jec t s  i n  
o the r  s o c i e t i e s  f a i l ed .  This success may be a t t r i b u t e d  t o  e f f i c i e n t  tech- 
n i c a l  management and e f f e c t i v e  concommitant de l ive ry  of a  wide v a r i e t y  of 
a g r i c u l t u r a l  inputs  and se rv ices ,  condit ions absent  i n  many p a r t s  of the  
world. The projec t  a l s o  c a p i t a l i z e d  on past  i r r i g a t i o n  programs and o the r  
current  a c t i v i t i e s .  To be p r o f i t a b l e ,  water management must be associa ted  
with sound p l a n t  breeding programs, f e r t i l i z e r  de l ive ry ,  r u r a l  c r e d i t ,  
c r e d i t ,  ex tens ion  se rv ices ,  and a  host  of o the r  ingredients .  It is 
the re fo re  not possible  to  i s o l a t e  a l l  t h e  c r i t i c a l  causa l  relat ionships--  
d iscuss ion  of some of them follow--to which must be added the  values and 
motivat ion of farm fami l i e s  a s  wel l  a s  the  incent ives  and sanc t ions  
r e s u l t i n g  from government policy. 
The i r r i g a t i o n  systems a r e  wel l  designed. Korea is a d i f f i c u l t  
environment i n  which t o  manage i r r i g a t i o n .  U n ~ r e d i c t a b l e  and r e l a t i v e l v  
- - 
heavy r a i n f a l l  causes f loods  o r  excessive water on the  rice-growing 
a l l u v i a l  plains.  Drainage problems r e s u l t .  The v a r i e t y  of i r r i g a t i o n  
systems supp r t e d  under t h i s  p ro jec t  c a l l e d  f o r  soph i s t i ca t ed  design and a 
management. This  impressive engineering and management commitment was 
e s s e n t i a l  t o  p ro jec t  e f fec t iveness .  The Korean government had t r i e d  
simpler water management systems, such a s  bench t e r r ac ing  and small ,  
shallow wells.  They did not  succeed. Current ly,  from upland watershed 
on-farm use,  o v e r a l l  water management can be charac ter ized  a s  exce l l en t .  
The high r i c e  p r i ce  pol icy  of the  government makes investment i n  r i c e  
c u l t i v a t i o n  p ro f i t ab le .  It covers r i s k  and unce r t a in ty ,  l abor ,  manage- 
ment, and r e t u r n  on c a p i t a l .  It i s  an apparent t r a n s f e r  of income from 
urban consumers and taxpayers t o  farmers,  because cheaper, i f  l e s s  palat-  
ab le ,  r i c e  could be imported. Improved farm income i n  turn  flows back t o  
t h e  urban-industr ial  s ec to r  through purchase of educat ion,  consumer dur- 
a b l e ~ ,  and consumption items. The increased a v a i l a b i l i t y  of goods and 
se rv ices  has accompanied the incen t ive  r i c e  pr ice .  The ex ten t  t o  which 
high r i c e  p r i c e s  paid t o  farmers a r e  passed back t o  poor urban consumers 
through increased r e t a i l  p r i ces ,  higher  taxes,  o r  i n f l a t i o n  has high 
s o c i a l  c o s t s  f o r  t h a t  group, a s  well  a s  f o r  farmers with l i t t l e  land. 
F e r t i l i z e r ,  pes t  management, chemicals, t i l l e r s ,  sp raye r s ,  improved 
seed,  and productive c r e d i t  a r e  widely ava i l ab le .  They have been neces- 
sary  to  pro jec t  success.  Furthermore, the  farmers know, o r  have been 
taught ,  how t o  'use e f f e c t i v e l y  these  ma te r i a l s  and have been motivated t o  
do so. A l l  the  high-yielding v a r i e t i e s  of r i c e  r equ i re  heavy f e r t i l i z a -  
t i on ;  t h e  newer s t r a i n s  a r e  more suscep t ib l e  t o  d isease ,  but with only 
marginal ly b e t t e r  y i e lds  than some of t h e  o lde r ,  but improved, v a r i e t i e s .  
The government subs id i zes  t h e  rou t ine  operat ions and c a p i t a l  c o s t s  of 
i r r i g a t i o n  systems. Government subsidy of the  opera t ions ,  management, 
deprec ia t ion ,  and c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  of these  systems ensures proper funct ion-  
ing  and supports  a  higher  farm income than i f  a l l  c o s t s  were recovered. 
Sunk c o s t s  i n  phys ica l  and s o c i a l  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  inf luenced the  
success of i r r i g a t i o n  and r i c e  production. Although the  combination 
i r r i g a t i o n  and drainage systems serve  d i s c r e t e  land a reas ,  they a r e  o f t e n  
p a r t  of very l a r g e  r i v e r  diking systems o r  depend on r i v e r  bas in  c o n t r o l  
dams t h a t  make the  i r r i g a t i o n  systems possible .  The o v e r a l l  road system, 
e l e c t r i c  g r i d ,  spare pa r t s  a v a i l a b i l i t y ,  and genera l  physical  i n f r a -  
s t r u c t u r e  a r e  c r i t i c a l  t o  the  successfu l  bui lding and opera t ion  of t h e  
i r r i g a t i o n  systems. Equally apparent  a r e  the  sunk c o s t s  i n  human c a p i t a l  
from t h e  farm fami l i e s  and throughout the soc ie ty .  
8. Farm Income and Wealth Distribution 
Data on farm size distribution reveal a range of 0.2 hectares to 2.0 
hectares with a mean of around 0.5 hectares. Although these farms are all 
small by many standards, there is, of course, still an income and wealth 
differential between the smaller and larger farmers. The value of the 
irrigation is capitalized into the value of land, and greatly increases 
the wealth position of the larger land owners. The smaller farmers are 
still in some situations net buyers of high-priced rice, while the larger 
farms have the marketable surplus. Renting irrigated land to other farm- 
ers appears much more profitable than renting it from landlords (see 
Appendix C). 
Income and wealth differentials appear to be largely functions of 
farm ownership and farm size, although several apparently well-off survey 
respondents were full tenants. Other farmers had very small amounts of 
owned land but had viable farms by renting in both rice and winter 
vegetable land. The small ownership pattern does not necessarily limit 
mobility, but clearly larger owneroperators command significantly greater 
resources to expand operations, weather adverse situations, and generally 
profit more from growth. There do not appear to be any significant 
policies or other causal relationships mitigating against widening farm 
wealth and income differentials. The trend has been in the opposite 
direction. Although there is little or no evidence of farms currently 
becoming larger, there is reportedly pressure and serious discussions 
nationally to lift the three hectare size limit on rice farms--a limit 
imposed by an effective land reform before the Korean War. Finally, 
although the agricultural laborers and very small farmers appear to have 
benefited from higher real wages, it is doubtful, in view of their poor 
living conditions, that they have increased their income in the same 
proportion as those with a self-sufficient amount of land. 
C. Employment and Demographic Effects 
There is no evidence that rice intensification and the expansion of 
rice acreage have led to greater numbers employed. Instead, there has 
been a combination of more intensive labor by many of those customarily 
employed and some mechanization. As in so many countries, concentration 
on rice and the intensified method of its cultivation have followed the 
pattern of first, introduction of mechanized land preparation and spraying 
and then, large amounts of chemical fertilizers. Labor for land prepara- 
tion, a male function, has declined with the introduction of the power 
tiller. In 1961 there were 21; in 1979, 235,909. With irrigation, labor 
for water control has declined sharply, from 25 to 30 days per hectare to 
10 days. However, labor for pest control, harvesting, transplanting, 
threshing, and' transportation have risen. Power threshing is widespread. 
Transplanting and harvesting, unmechanized, are largely female functions. 
This was observed in the villages. Pesticide spraying labor increased 
slightly, but it has not offered employment beyond the farm operator or 
the owner of the sprayer. Thus on-farm male labor has decreased somewhat, 
but female labor has increased. This has resulted in the relative demand 
for male and female labor narrowing slightly the difference between men's 
and women's wages; more so in the more prosperous and, therefore, mechan- 
ized villages. But gender-specificity of tasks and rigidity of custom are 
probably a c t i n g  a s  brakes on a f a s t e r  narrowing process. I n  genera l ,  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  l abore r s  and very small  farm opera tors  be l ieve  they have 
benef i ted  from genera l  farming p rospe r i ty  through higher  r e a l  wages. But 
off-farm r u r a l  employment i n  terms of new jobs i n  the v i l l a g e  has not 
increased s i g n i f i c a n t l y .  The p i c tu re  is d i f f e r e n t  i n  the  market towns and 
county sea ts .  
There has been n e g l i g i b l e  l o c a l  c r e a t i o n  of new jobs a s  a r e s u l t  of 
r i s i n g  farm income. With t h e  Sae-maul movement undertaking almost a l l  
l o c a l  phys ica l  i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l  and housing improvement (us ing  unpaid 
l a b o r ) ,  these  a c t i v i t i e s  have not generated income-gaining employment. 
Much of t h e  increase  i n  household incomes has been spent on educat ion and 
consumer durables ,  employing people from the  urban sector .  Vi l lage  r e t a i l  
s t o r e s  genera l ly  expand t h e i r  business  without taking on e x t r a  employees. 
There is no evidence t h a t  t h e  Sae-maul movement, which aims a t  r e in fo rc ing  
and encouraging r u r a l  economic expansion, has been i n t e r e s t e d  i n  
c a p i t a l i z i n g  on higher r u r a l  purchasing power by e s t a b l i s h i n g  p e r t i n e n t  
small  manufacturing and r e p a i r  shops. Ins tead ,  i t  has b u i l t  r a t h e r  l a r g e  
f a c t o r i e s  competing with o r  supplementing urban f a c t o r i e s ,  and t h e r e  a r e  
a l ready s igns  t h a t  the  i n d u s t r i a l  recess ion  is h i t t i n g  them f i r s t  ( s e e  
Appendix G). 
The gender s p e c i f i c i t y  of c u l t i v a t i o n  t a sks  has l ed  t o  an abso lu te  
r i s e  i n  demand f o r  female labor ,  and, given the dec l ine  i n  male-typed 
t a sks ,  a r e l a t i v e  r i s e  a s  well. Wonen claimed t h a t  they f e l t  t h e  g r e a t e r  
work burden began 5 t o  6 yea r s  ago, not only from farm work, but  p a r t i a l l y  
a s  a r e s u l t  of t h e  progressive withdrawal of ch i ldren  from f i e l d  work t o  
classroom. Considerable evidence was acquired of a pronounced d e s i r e  t o  
l i m i t  family s i ze .  I n  gene ra l ,  bet ter-off  women bel ieved two ch i ld ren  t o  
be the  i d e a l  number, whereas poorer women maintained th ree  o r  four  t o  be 
des i rab le .  
Although t h e  rural-urban income d i f f e r e n t i a l  has narrowed, t h e  
farming community be l ieves  t h a t  ma te r i a l  condit ions a r e  super ior  i n  the  
c i t i e s .  Increased incomes have opened higher  l e v e l s  of educat ion and 
fueled r i s i n g  expecta t ions ,  both of which have encouraged the  continua- 
t i o n ,  o r  even acce le ra t ion ,  of t h e  out-migration of young people with 
theapproval  of ,  and f inancing by, t h e i r  parents .  A t  the  o the r  end of t h e  
i n c  m e  spectrum, t h e  very poor see few oppor tun i t i e s  f o r  advancement and 
a r e ,  t he re fo re ,  a l s o  keen t o  see t h e i r  ch i ld ren  leave. 
Continued out-migration and f a l l i n g  b i r t h  r a t e s  together  r a i s e  the  
ques t ion  of t h e  aging of farmers and the  f u t u r e  of the  present  farm s i z e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  and i t s  family base. Many farmers and t h e i r  wives be l ieved  
they were the  l a s t  genera t ion  i n  t h e i r  f ami l i e s  t o  farm. Others hoped 
t h a t  one son would remain. 
Commenting on the  1970s, a Harvard study of Korean r u r a l  develop- 
ment noted t h e  "rapid shr inking  of the  young adu l t  work force  i n  farm 
households" and "the higher  labor  force  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  among o lde r  men and 
middle-aged and o lder  women.3 There was abundant verba l  evidence i n  t h e  
3 ~ t u d i e s  i n  t h e  Modernization t o  t h e  Republic of Korea 1945-75, Rural  
Development. Council of East Asian Studies.  Cambridge,.Harvard 
Univers i ty  P res s ,  1980, p. 356. 
project areas that this process is continuing apace, and that "only the 
old people will be left to farm". Although real rural incomes have 
increased greatly, official data indicate that urban real wages are still 
rising faster than rural real wages. More importantly, both the poor and 
wealthier rural population believe they would be materially better off in 
the cities. The fact that sons are somewhat favored over daughters in 
educational opportunities and the male rural wage market has probably con- 
tracted are good reasons to expect more young men than young women to mi- 
grate. Rut there is little to keep young women in rural areas. If they 
are poor, they are probably working harder in the fields than before. 
Their domestic drudgery remains unaltered by education or television. The 
land reform was for men only, and women's participation in farmers' coop- 
eratives and FLIA meetings is virtually zero. As in other countries, 
while rural men may migrate with rising expectations, rural women, in ad- 
dition to this, are fleeing constant work and rural patriarchy. 
This heavy migration raises questions about the future agrarian 
structure. The Harvard study noted that migration up to the 1960s (mostly 
uneducated young) was a brake on farm subdivision after inheritance. The 
larger farm tended to increase in size and to have younger operators while 
the very smallest holdings were operated by an increased proportion of 
people 65 years and 01der.~ Farm size distribution and farm operator 
status may alter. First, children from the larger farms are much better 
educated now than a decade ago and few may wish to actually operate their 
inheritance. Second, the industrial recession is already sending young 
people back to rural areas. If this continues for any length of time, job 
candidates' levels of education may increasingly be used as a device for 
allocating urban jobs, so that the poorly educated rural migrants will re- 
turn in disproportionate numbers to the countryside. Several people 
interviewed believed poor families will stay on the land. If the migrants 
view their land inheritance as a moderately yielding, gilt-edged invest- 
ment underpinning their uncertain urban sojourn, they may settle for rent- 
ing their land to the remaining poor at rates viable to the poor. If they 
are optimistic about urban economic growth and appalled at the thought of 
returning to a rural background, they may sell their land inheritance, 
most likely to other richer farmers. 
D. Welfare and Participation 
The project has undoubtedly contributed to rising household income in 
real terms. Longer periods of schooling, more frequent consumption of 
meat, and the recent acquisition of radios, televisions, rice cookers, and 
electric fans were regarded as indicators of improved conditions of life. 
However, from a basic needs viewpoint the present pattern of increased 
expenditure appears uneven. Education is the first priority, while 
nutrition appears to be the last. In particular, weaning foods do not 
appear to have changed from the traditional introduction of rice soup at 
eight months of age even in the most prosperous families. There was 
evidence that female agricultural laborers and women from very small farms 
practice breast-feeding least because of their need to work in the fields. 
The decline in the use of child labor in the fields and the intensified 
annual load of women's work in transplanting and harvesting have meant 
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that the advances in education and the acquisition of consumer durables 
have been accompanied by additional work for women. In some villages this 
was partly redressed by the recent introduction of pump water for domestic 
use and new washing points. 
Farmers have made substantial contributions, in labor and cash, to 
infrastructural improvements in the village but have little power or 
authority. In spite of their (partial) attendance at meetings of the 
farmers' cooperatives and the local FLIA, their participation does not 
extend to decision-making on priorities or planning. The FLIA is not, as 
the project paper stated, a "cooperative". It is a bureaucratic entity 
designed to deliver water and collect water fees. It is non-participa- 
tory. There has been little mobilization of villagers' requests for 
specific projects, and what has been implemented appears to have been 
initiated via a form of "commandism" from a level higher than the village. 
The democratic process of decision-making on the allocation of village 
resources is weak. Although the funds of women's clubs have sometimes 
been used to subsidize construction efforts through their provision of 
meals for male workers, these clubs appear less active than before and are 
poorly integrated into other village institutions. With no direct repre- 
sentation in the farmers' cooperatives or the local FLIA, and without 
being direct recipients of training and extension services, women's social 
participation is negligible. Welfare improvements from higher incomes 
have largely by-passed women, who also tend to work harder in the paddy 
fields. This accords with the private goals of investing not so much in 
the immediate satisfaction of basic needs but in removing the next genera- 
tion from the countryside. 
Rural Korea is a clear example that income gains need not go hand in ' 
hand with civic development. The role of the farmers was to attend, if 
they wished, FLIA and farmers' cooperatives meetings to receive informa- 
tion and instructions. There was nothing said during interviews in favor 
of village community life to counteract the powerful force of using 
agricultural prosperity as a springboard to better things in the cities. 
There is a general mood of private ambitions and urban drift. The - Sae- 
maul movement, can offer construction of housing, water supplies and roads 
-
in selected villages, but is not sufficient to offer the rural population 
a new sense of belonging to their villages. The people still want to 
leave. 
In this respect, the intended end-results of irrigation (and other 
means to rural higher incomes) and government policy are widely diverging. 
The only thing that might converge their respective intentions would be a 
serious industrial recession. Unless this happens, present government 
rural development policy is creating massive contradictions for the 
future. 
The irrigation associations and government-sponsored farm coopera- 
tives clearly fulfilled their economic functions but social objectives are 
probably met only rhetorically. Integration of irrigation associations 
and farming cooperatives exists, but the Sae-maul movement and women's 
clubs are less well planned. Women's clubs offer no new channel for their 
potential because of the absence of village level horizontal links. 
Instead of offering the clubs support for developmental activities, the 
Sae-maul movement absorbed some of their funds by imposing an extension of 
women's traditional domestic duties--feeding the construction workers. 
The environmental impact of the project itself was generally positive 
as it has in some cases improved drainage and, when coupled with extensive 
reforestation, reduced siltation. However, it is sometimes overshadowed 
by non-project factors that impinge upon the project. In one area (Man- 
gyung-kang, North Cholla), industrial pollution of a major stream has been 
so intense that at certain periods of the year, water cannot be used for 
irrigation. This did not seem to be in the specific project area, but 
rather in the overall basin development of which the A.1.D.-supported 
sub-project was a very small part. 
Of more general concern, if less visible and as yet unmeasured, is 
the vast increase in the use of pesticides and fertilizer on the quality 
of irrigation water, and thus, perhaps, on people's lives. Pesticide use 
has risen from 5.6 million kilograms (kg.) in 1961 to 62.6 million kg. in 
1974; fertilizer use was 151.7 kg. per hectare in 1961, growing to 395.7 
kg. in 1975. Irrigation water is often the source for washing by family 
members, and drinking water is often piped from reservoirs that are also 
not free from these chemicals--their health implications deserve serious 
study by the Korean government. 
E. Replicability of the Irrigation Systems 
The replicability of the irrigation systems for Korea is not at is- 
sue, for virtually 100 percent of paddy is irrigated to some degree. If 
this were not the case, additional systems in more marginal areas would 
probably be uneconomic. Of importance, however, is the development of 
similar systems for other societies. The Korean success has been depen- 
dent on a multitude of factors, the complexity of which may make the 
Korean experience less adaptable to most other developing countries, at 
least until they can commit signficant resources to rural growth beyond 
just irrigation infrastructure. These factors included extensive 
managerial and engineering capacities, the high support price for rice. 
and a previous heavy investment in rural roads that makes relatively 
areas responsive to the demand for urban foodstuffs. These needs cast 
doubt on the Korean model's replicability, unless rural participation and 
consideration of women's special needs are included in project design. 
This would increase costs signficantly. 
Sustaining the present system under existing conditions seems rea- 
sonably well-assured. Farmers could pay for the use of the water and the 
amortization of the system even without the 70 percent government subsidy 
in their construction. This sustainability for small farms is heavily de- 
pendent upon the continuation of a high support price. If this is re- 
duced, then the average size farm and those that are smaller may have to 
alter their cropping patterns and turn to vegetables or other crops, a 
move that is currently illegal without government approval. 
In the longer term, the massive migration of young, better-educated 
people will affect the size of the rural work force and the agrarian 
structure. What this may mean for the future of the small farm is specu- 
lative. A lengthy and deep industrial recession would likely call into 
question the continuation of the present high rice-support policy. Sus- 
taining these systems is thus dependent on macro-economic factors over 
which farmers and foreign donors alike will have little, if any, influence. 
IV. LESSONS LEARNED 
1. More attention should be paid to overall economic trends and col- 
lecting better base-line data in project design. This would have led to 
more realistic expectations of project results. To speed approval, 
analysis is often included early in project implementation, rather than in 
project design. This may lead to false expectations. The careful 
baseline data that were built into the project after approval should have 
been done before approval. Had the latest data on rice imports and 
production been reviewed during project design, the goal of minimizing 
rice imports might have been changed to a more realistic one of main- 
taining rice self-sufficiency. Had data been available on the relative 
profitability of rice and barley production and an analysis made of 
changing wheat imports and consumption, the goals of promoting barley 
production and national self-sufficiency might have been abandoned. A 
better appraisal of the potential project also required more information 
on irrigation techniques, expected yields, realistic net incremental 
income targets on small farms, potential cropping patterns, and 
participation. 
remarkable capability tomonitor the design, construction, and operation 
of these systems. The project required no outside technical assistance, 
and none was provided. 
3. The project may have succeeded because it was focused on a single 
element--irrigation--but equally because other coordinating elements were 
in place. Project design was simply conceived as irrigation alone, and 
thus administration was focused on a single institution. This allowed a 
clear chain of command to implement the project. As important as this 
focus was, the necessary supplementary and supportive elements of price 
incentives, extension, credit, storage, transportation and marketing were, 
fortuitously, present. Without them, it is very doubtful whether irriga- 
tion alone would have proved profitable. Water control and its management 
is a major objective of many countries, but we doubt its general effec- 
tiveness as a single-factor approach. 
4. Where irrigation is added to already effective and existing farming 
systems--such as converting rain-fed paddy to irrigated paddy--trading on 
a type of sunk cost, small and medium-scale irrigation can be an economic 
endeavor. In the Korean case, with its high rice price support policy, 
it appears the farmers could pay operational and maintenance, as well as 
capital, costs. Farming and irrigation systems are sensitive to input and 
product prices, to capital costs of development and to the ability of 
engineers, maintenance staff, and farmers to construct and actually operate 
the systems. It is dangerous to assume, as is often the case, that the 
parts will nicely fall together. Product prices relative to development 
costs throw serious doubt on the economics of new land development such as 
swamplands or tidelands. There are no sunk capital costs in these cases 
on which to rest the project. Assuming the basic undertaking has long-run 
potential, and if a nation is concerned about developing land and farms, a 
country, and the world investment community, may very well have to accept 
a low rate of return for social, political, or other reasons. 
5.  There is a need to review alternative agricultural technologies. Very 
high yields are needed to sustain the investment in irrigation systems 
and to attain reasonable farm incomes. Korea has had high-yielding 
Japonica rice varieties for decades, but recently has bred somewhat 
higher-yielding varieties (HYV). However, some statistics show that under 
good management, the best of the older varieties yield very close to the 
new WVs. Farmers were concerned about the greater levels of inputs 
needed for the HYVs. To obtain similar yields, the older varieties would 
probably require similar levels of inputs, but the HYVs are somewhat more 
susceptible to disease, particularly neck blast. Korea has a vigorous 
research program to determine the agronomic and economic issues at stake. 
Farmers should be made aware of the various alternatives so they fully 
understand the potential risks and gains from each production strategy. 
6. Even in Korea, which had a successful land reform program, there is a 
conflict between national production targets and income distribution 
considerations. Improved income is intimately correlated with farm size. 
Although there are no large landlords in paddy production, gains from the 
project are spread unevenly depending upon previous farm size, which in 
turn is a prime requisite for raising venture capital for agricultural 
diversification. If programs are designed to share more evenly the fruits 
of project investment, more graduated water prices or other tax mechanisms 
should be considered. Women, excluded from land reform, benefited least 
in equity terms. Land reform alone is not a sufficient condition to 
ensure equity. 
7. Local participation in the Korean project was not a prerequisite of 
project success. Korean bureaucratic centralism and hierarchical social 
structures neither allowed farmers nor their wives to participate to any 
significant degree in the decisiohmaking on project design o; execution. 
Economically successful, the project has not increased the sense of 
community or developed locally sponsored institutions. Perhaps special- 
purpose irrigation projects should not be expected to spawn community 
development. 
8. Unless women are positively included in project design considera- 
tions, the conditions under which they work can be exacerbated. Women 
were never mentioned in the ~roiect desinn. Althounh thev have benefited 
. " . - 
as farm incomes have risen, they have benefited unequally. Laborsaving 
technology in the fields has benefited men primarily; women are obliged to 
undertake larger shares of field work as their children leave home for 
school or urban employment. If projects are not designed to recognize sex 
specialization of agricultural tasks and patriarchal elements in society, 
sex inequalities may very likely increase. 
9. Any assumption that may have existed that there is a strong correla- 
tion between improved income and better family nutritional standards is 
false in non-subsistence economies. Enhanced income has little impact on 
nutritional standards of members of the family, and no positive impact on 
infant nutrition. Instead, rising incomes were universally regarded as a 
means of upward social and economic mobility directed to the cities 
through higher education for children. If Korean farmers had been poorer, 
then perhaps better nutrition might have been perceived as more important. 
Korean families appear more healthy than in the past. 
10. The Korean developmental successes should not obscure emerging 
developmental problems. The search for production through administrative 
conformity has set targets that are often fulfilled with little regard for 
the environmental or human consequences. Serious industrial pollution of 
water is evident. Directed use of pesticides and herbicides seems 
excessive, with scant attention to environmental or health considerations 
other than avoidance of immediate contamination of people. Government 
quotas force adherence to policies as well as contributions of labor and 
time that may have longrun benefits for the fanner, but may cause 
hardship in the short term. Villagers' involvement in local government is 
non-existent. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Rural development in Korea has made great progress. Korean rice 
farmers are now among the best in the world. Korean 1977 yields of 4.8 
metric tons of milled rice per hectare exceeded Japan, Egypt, Taiwan and 
the U.S. The nation has succeeded in meeting one of the national 
aggregate grain production goals--rice--but that success has contributed 
to the failure or irrelevance of barley goals, production of which is 
still needed for feed, if not food. Korea has eliminated some of the 
gross inequities of urban and rural income distribution. Irrigation has 
been one of several important elements in this effort, and the A.I.D. con- 
tribution to its expansion, although modest in comparison to the Korean 
commitment, has been successful. It has followed, not led, the Korean 
effort. 
Rural Korean progress has not been the engine that has pulled past 
development. Earlier national economic plans emphasized industrialization 
and export promotion. Only in the past decade has the government 
attempted to redress the balance between urban and rural Korea. It has 
done so without local participation in local decision-making, essentially 
without reference to the female population. It is not a model for other 
societies. 
AID'S assistance in Korea will soon end, so policy recommendations 
emanating from this impact evaluation should be applicable to other 
development programs. Korea is probably sui generis. Other developing 
societies lack the extensive infrastructure and development services in 
rural areas, together with national grain pricing and procurement 
policies, that allowed this project to succeed. Further investment in 
medium, or even smaller, size irrigation should be determined by the 
nature of the nation's rural commitment and institutional capacity as 
evidenced by its economic policies. 
Korea, in economic terms, is no longer a developing country. The 
irrigation project was proposed and completed when Korea already had an 
educated population and extensive infrastructure. In fact, the precon- 
dition of a successful transfer of funds for irrigation, such as this 
project, may have been previously successful developmental effort. Korea, 
at least in the short run, has been able to afford to be autocratic by 
being efficient. 
Even after land reform, and without great rural income disparities, 
Korea demonstrates that there are direct conflicts between production 
goals and income distribution targets. This will be even more pronounced 
in nations where land is more unevenly distributed. 
Overall project success in rice production and income improvement was 
possible in large measure because of the high support price. Korea could 
import at least 50 percent more rice than it could produce domestically 
with the same expenditure. There are, however, longer-term considerations 
for setting aside the short-term international comparative advantages 
argument. Relations of economic exchange between urban and rural areas 
are similar to those between "North" and "South" countries. As the Brandt 
Commission report argues for a substantial transfer of wealth from the 
North to the South in order to raise incomes in the latter and, in turn, 
an increased demand for goods from the North, so rural areas may depend on 
wealth/income transfers from urban areas before they are in a position to 
purchase more urban goods. In Korea, the rural areas' income elasticity 
of demand for urban goods and services has already shown itself to be very 
high, hence setting up an internal growth pattern. 
Irrigation projects alone should not necessarily be considered an 
unrestricted good. Preparation of such projects in other societies may 
require greater attention to national and local administrative capacity 
and delivery of supporting services. The social aspects of project 
development, including migration, employment, and the effect on women, 
need greater attention. Irrigation projects can succeed, but they are 
heavily dependent on related infrastructure and national macro-economic 
policies, as well as on the farmers' motivation and goals. 
The income level of Korea in the late seventies enabled the consumer 
to pay relatively high prices for rice, which is increasingly a smaller 
portion of household expenditures. The more typical situation in other 
countries is where attempts are made to hold down both consumer farm 
prices. That policy results in poor farm production and ineffective use 
and maintenance of irrigation systems. The Korean case of food and farm 
, gate prices may be one that deserves considerable attention if countries 
are serious about increasing production through irrigation. 
APPENDIX A 
METHODOLOGY 
Methodology 
From the meager information ava i l ab le  t o  the  team i n  Washington p r i o r  
t o  i t s  departure,  t he re  seemed t o  be four f a c t o r s  tha t  might have had a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  impact on choice of which of the s ix ty-s ix  pro jec t  s i t e s  the 
team should v i s i t .  These were: s i z e ,  type of i r r i g a t i o n  system, i n t e r n a l  
r a t e  of r e tu rn ,  and locat ion.  Location seemed of l e s s  importance s ince  
Korea i s  e t h n i c a l l y  homogenous and provincia l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a r e  
res idual ,  having found expression i n  p o l i t i c a l  fac t ional i sm,  some economic 
discriminat ion i n  investment p r i o r i t i e s .  and marriage pa t t e rns  more than 
i n  any other  a c t i v i t i e s .  Provincia l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  nevertheless  seemed 
des i rable .  The i n t e r n a l  r a t e  of r e tu rn  had separa te  problems ( see  
Appendix C), and had been twice ca lcula ted  by the Mission, although not 
with standard procedures. Thus, two f a c t o r s  seemed t o  hold most p o t e n t i a l  
f o r  choosing s i t e s  t o  v i s i t .  These were: the  s i z e  of the  p ro jec t  and 
whether the system was one t h a t  used outs ide  energy sources (pumping 
systems), o r  one t h a t  r e l i e d  on g rav i ty  flow, i.e., r e se rvo i r  or  drainage 
canal  systems. Size seemed important because smaller systems might prove 
more expensive per hec tare  served. Pumps required energy, and d i e s e l  f u e l  
cos t s  i n  Korea were very high. There was no way of knowing i n  advance 
whether the  pumps used were e l e c t r i c  o r  d i e se l .  
The team determined t h a t  one of the  66 p r o j e c t s  was obviously 
a t y p i c a l  because of i t s  magnitude. This was the  Sin-gog system i n  Kyunggi 
Province. It comprised 15,000 hec ta res ,  and was a l n o s t  30 percent of the 
t o t a l  area t o  be i r r i g a t e d .  Because i t  was so l a rge ,  we f e l t  it was 
necessary t o  study it. 
The remainder of the  65 p r o j e c t s  were then divided i n t o  groups by 
three  s i zes :  those up t o  300 hectares ,  from 301 t o  799 hectares ,  and over 
800 hectares. This gave a s p l i t  of 28 small p ro jec t s ,  18 medium-sized and 
19 l a rge  projects .  The choice of s i z e  was i n  p a r t  a r b i t r a r y ,  t o  ensure 
t h a t  a l l  s i z e  systems would be v i s i t e d .  
A s t r a t i f i e d  sample by type of system and s i z e  was randomly se l ec ted :  
th ree  i r r i g a t i o n  systems t h a t  were small and re se rvo i r ,  three  t h a t  were 
small and pump. In the same manner, s i x  medium-size systems were chosen 
and s i x  la rge  systems, f o r  a t o t a l  of eighteen,  p lus  the  Sin-gog system. 
This,  then, was t h e  maximum number t h a t  could be v i s i t e d  within t h e  
time period avai lable ;  t h a t  is, i n  a period of th ree  weeks i n  the  country. 
This could mean one system v i s i t e d  on some days, two on o the r s ,  with the  
remainder f o r  t r a v e l  time. In case a smaller number had t o  be chosen, the  
team i n i t i a l l y  f e l t  t h a t  twelve should be the  minimum (two within each of 
the  s i x  squares of the  matrix, e.g., two small pumps, two small 
r e se rvo i r s ,  e t c .  ). 
The mix of nineteen p o t e n t i a l  p ro jec t s  was, the team f e l t ,  a good 
sampling of p ro jec t  s i t e s .  That number represented 29 percent  of the  
p ro jec t s ,  and 58.9 percent of the  planned hectarage was included. 
By chance the  s e l e c t i o n  included both p ro jec t s  with high and low 
i n t e r n a l  and f i n a n c i a l  r a t e s  of return.  Eight of the  nine provinces of 
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Korea have project sites (the exception was the island of Cheiu). Of 
eight provinces, sites were randomly selected in seven provinces. Some 
were clearly very isolated, and others were relatively close to major 
cities. Two sites were on very remote islands of the extreme northwest 
and southwest coasts, and the team withheld judgment whether they could be 
visited within the time limits set by the evaluation. Some systems were 
in areas known to be traditional in outlook; others clearly close to a 
center of industrial growth. 
The question was raised whether any sites could not meet payments on 
the irrigation system; if so, a determination would be made after con- 
sultation in Seoul whether these should be included. Initially Seoul was 
not informed in advance as to the site selections. It was hoped that some 
of the sites chosen would be correlated with those for which economic and 
social baseline data were available. The new road system made it possible 
to reach the southern extremity of Korea in five hours, where it had once 
taken over twelve hours; so all sites, except those on the islands, were 
within one day's travel of Seoul. Final choice would be made after 
consultations in Seoul. 
On arrival on Seoul, it was apparent after examining the files that 
the team had lacked critical information on the sub-projects as eventually 
agreed between the U.S. and Korean governments. First, two projects had 
been excluded from the agreement signed September 11, 1974, and the amend- 
ments signed April 30, 1975 and September 13, 1975. Two others were sub- 
stituted. Then eleven projects were eliminated from AID reimbursement as 
funds were insufficient to cover all planned projects. Five of these were 
included in the team's initial list. Thus, there were fifty-five sub- 
projects completed with A.I.D. funds from which site visits were to be 
chosen. No projects were behind in repayments, or had other problems, 
thus eliminating one potential modification of site selection. 
The random sample method was continued for all AID funded sub- 
projects, and a total of eighteen projects chosen, excluding the islands 
(time would not permit the visit in the extreme southwest, and the island 
in the northwest is located at the demilitarized zone, separated from 
North Korea by a small estuary, and would require special military 
permission to visit.) In this sample there was breadth of types of 
projects and internal rate of return (both high and low), and seven of the 
eight provinces were represented. Although seven of the eighteen projects 
sites picked were in South Kyungsang Province (37 percent), 30 percent of 
all approved sites were in the same province. 
These eighteen sites totalled 12,145 hectares planned for irrigation, 
or 45 percent of all 55 sub-project hectarage, and included one third of 
all sub-projects. The team was able to visit fifteen* sites (27.3 
percent) representing 38 percent of total hectarage irrigated. Revised 
* Through misinformation supplied at the local= office, one site was 
visited that was in the major irrigation development area but was not the 
specific site attributed to AID funding. 
planned site visits and actual field work locations are included as 
Appendix B. Chinese characters for all sites and locations are in 
Appendix J. 
The team had envisaged reservoir systems as small catchment dams at 
the heads of valleys from which water flowed by gravity into the paddy 
fields. Such systems are ubiquitous throughout Korea. 
As the team visited project sites, it was apparent that the initial 
division into surface (reservoir) and pumping systems was not accurate. A 
pumping system, for example, might include pumping to a reservoir, and 
drainage systems might employ pumps both for drainage and irrigation. 
Only three simple gravity-flow systems were found in the sample. 
The team drove a total of some 2,300 kilometers throughout the 
country to visit 15 sites. Some sites, such as the North Cholla Province 
Man-Kyung Gang extension, were almost within urban city limits. Others, 
such as Se-do on South Chungchong Province, were over 35 kilometers from a 
paved road on a rough dirt track, isolated geographically but tied to 
urban areas by a sophisticated vegetable marketing system organized 
entirely by the farmers themselves. The general pattern was for the three 
foreign members of the team together with their Korean counterparts to 
visit the gun (county) or myon (township) irrigation office to get 
generalized statistics on the project. These included: planned and 
actual hectarage covered; total planned and actual costs of construction 
and dates of initiation and completion of the project, water fees charged 
farms, crop yields before and after the project, number of beneficiary 
households and average farm size; relation of the project to other 
irrigation efforts in the same locality; details of equipment, canal, 
etc.; and performance of the equipment. The team then visited the project 
site, splitting into three groups of two each (a Korean and a foreigner), 
and separately visiting fields or village houses to talk individually or 
in groups to farmers or their wives. Discussions were held with perhaps 
one hundred farmers and their wives, A special point was made to seek out 
women, and a female interpreter was added to the group to assist in this 
effort. The team then met together at the close of each site visit to 
discuss their findings. There seemed to be a remarkable degree of 
consistency in the observations of the team members with some relatively 
minor deviations in figures. 
In addition to the site visits, AID had sponsored a separate social 
survey of 16 of the original 66 project sites that'were to be funded by 
AID. This survey, by the Korea Rural Economics Institute dnder the 
direction of Dr. Kim Dong-11, was carried out prior to the arrival of the 
team. After the site visits were completed, the results of that survey 
were discussed ,with the team, and some of the findings are included in 
Appendix E of this report. A full analysis of the study will be published 
separately at a later date. 
The social survey by the Korea Rural Economics Institue of 16 sites 
was designed to supplement the economic surveys done by the same institute 
in cooperation with professor Richard Duvick of Ohio State University. 
The base line data of these latter surveys was collected in 1975, and the 
same areas will be resurveyed by the Duvick-KREI team during the harvest 
of 1980 (October-November). These results wil also be published at a 
later date. 
These four efforts, the social survey of 16 AID sites, the two 
time-phased economic surveys five years apart, and this impact evaluation 
will provide considerable material that will help in analyzing the growth 
of Korea's rural economy. 
In addition to these studies. Dr. Martin E. Hanratty of Michigan 
State University published a monograph. "A Post-Project Economic Evalua- 
tion of Selected Small and Medium Scale Land and Water Development 
Projects Funded by USAID in Korea" (Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
Seoul: December 1976). An analysis has also been done of IBRD projects 
(see Appendix HI. Small and medium scale irrigation in Korea has been 
well studied. 
APPENDIX B 
REVISED SITE SELECTION: KOREAN IRRIGATION SYSTEMS 
Revised S i t e  Se lec t ion  : 
Korean I r r i g a t i o n  Systems 
(By Province) 
P ro jec t  Planned 
Paper No. Province - Name Hectares 
Kyunggi Province 
2 1 8 Gun-am 288 
66 10 Goong-pyong 210 
56 11 Yeo-ju 180 
North Chungchong Province 
25 1 Keum-dong 883 
South Chungchong Province 
19 9 Se-do 31 7 
North Cholla Province 
5 Do-song 7 8 
6 Man-kyung-gang 2,099 
South Cholla Province 
8 Song-we01 
10 Ku-mon 
North KyunRsang Province 
18 San-nam 
1 Mae-ho 
South Kyungsang Province 
14 1 Myung Kwan 
2 10 Yoon-nae 
11 17 Jang-yo0 
1 9 Ha-gi 
3 6 Chang-woon 
38 2 Ha-nam 
9 14 Cho-gye 
FRR 
-
23% 
18% 
27% 
26% 
2 4% 
22% 
39% 
19% 
2 4% 
17% 
26% 
2 6% 
77% 
24% 
56% 
67% 
2 6% 
26% 
Reservoir 
Surf ace  
Resesvoir 
Reservoir 
pump 
pump 
Reservoir 
Drainage 
pump 
Surf ace 
Surf ace  
Surf ace 
Pump 
Team V i s i t s  
Dates 
Previous Page Blank 
Korea Irrigation Systems 
(Planned Hectarage) 
Type Small (to 300 hectares) 
Project 
Paper No. Name Province Hectare FRR* 
Surf ace ** 14 Myong- South 268 26% 
Kwan Kyungsang 
** 37 Do-Bong North 78 22% 
Cholla 
5 9 Seong- South 70 19% 
We01 Cholla 
Pump ** 66 Goong- Kyungki 210 18% 
Pyong 
** 56 Yeo-Ju Kyungki 180 27% 
* *  21 Gun-Am Kyungki 288 23% 
Medium (301 - 799 hectares) 
Surface ** 2 Yoon Nae South 650 77% 
Kyungsang 
* *  30 Ku-Man South Cholla 56 24% 
1 Ha-gi South 553 56% 
Kyungsang 
Pump ** 53 San-Nam North 320 17% 
Kyungsang 
* *  19 Se-Do South 317 24% 
Chungchong 
** 28 Mae-ho North 546 26% 
Kyungsang 
Large (800 - up hectares) 
Surf ace ** 3 Chang- South 1832 67% 
Woon Kyungsang 
** 38 Ha-nam South 818 26% 
Kyungsang 
** 24 Man- North 2,099 39% 
Kyung- Cholla 
gang 
Pump ** 11 Sang Yoo South 1,377 24% 
Kyungsang 
** 25 Keum- North 883 26% 
Dong Chungchong 
9 Cho-gye South 1,140 26% 
Kyungsang 
* Financial Rate of Return (from Project Paper) 
** Actual Site Visits 
APPENDIX C 
I. TYPES OF IRRIGATION SYSTEMS 
11. ECONOMICS OF THE IRRIGATION AND FARMING SYSTEM 
111. FARM LAND IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATIONS 
IV. KOREAN LAND-LEASING SYSTEM 
by 
Robert B. Morrow 
I. The Types of I r r i g a t i o n  Systems 
Although t h e  command a r e a s  of t h e  i r r i g a t i o n  systems a r e  not l a rge  i n  
comparison t o  major r i v e r  bas in  o r  dese r t  reclamation p ro jec t s ,  they 
never the less  r equ i re  good management because many of the systems have 
f a i r l y  large-sized e l e c t r i c  and diesel-driven pumps and o f t en  use systems 
reflows. They have up t o  540 horsepower (hp) d i e s e l  and 500 hp e l e c t r i c  
motors with pump-capacity of from 1 t o  4 cubic meters per second. The 55 
p ro jec t s  A.I.D. f inanced ranged i n  s i z e  of from 70 t o  2092 hec tares  i n  
a c t u a l  benefi ted area .  The sample p ro jec t s  v i s i t e d  were from 75 t o  1832 
hec tares  i n  s ize.  There a r e  b a s i c a l l y  four types of systems; ( 1 )  s to rage  
dams with g rav i ty  flow t o  the  r i c e  paddies; ( 2 )  r i v e r  i r r i g a t i o n  pumps; 
( 3 )  i r r i g a t i o n  and drainage combination systems and, ( 4 )  pumping from 
r i v e r s  t o  r e se rvo i r s  and g rav i ty  flow t o  paddies. .These systems a r e  
described below ( see  Table 1 f o r  the  sample l i s t  and cos t  of systems): 
A. Storage Reservoirs  
The survey team v i s i t e d  th ree  of the  gravity-fed systems, one medium- 
s i zed  d a m  and two small  ones. There were 32 of these  dams b u i l t  and they 
ranged i n  s i z e  from 6.6 t o  33 meters i n  height  t o  90 t o  1960 meters long. 
The sur face  r e se rvo i r s  were from 6 t o  334 hec tares .  The command areas  
were from 560 t o  70 hectares .  Of the  th ree  s i t e s  v i s i t e d ,  a l l  were 
operat ing e f f ec t ive ly .  A t  Myung Kwan the  people mentioned an inadequate 
spi l lway capaci ty  during the  1979 typhoon, but whatever damage may had 
been done to  the dam or  paddy f i e l d s  near the  dam had been repaired.  The 
area  i n  the  upper reaches of the  pro jec t  had converted upland t o  paddy, 
the  lower reaches were, and s t i l l  a r e ,  the  b e t t e r  i r r i g a t e d  a reas  a s  i t  
takes considerable time t o  develop upland fanning a r e a s  t o  good paddy 
land. 
I n  1974 t h e  cons t ruc t ion  c o s t s  of these  dams were q u i t e  low. The 
Ku-nam dam has a very l a r g e  concrete  spillway and the  water r e l e a s e  ga te  
house i s  well  back i n  t h e  reservoi r .  
The average costs--in 1974 terms--was only $1900 per  hec ta re  t o  bui ld  
the dam and t o  put i n  the i r r i g a t i o n  system; the  c o s t s  today would be much 
higher. Although the  IBRD has  found t h i s  type of i r r i g a t i o n  system 
cur ren t ly  t o  show poor r a t e s  of r e t u r n  due t o  high cons t ruc t ion  c o s t s  and 
long lead times t o  complete the system, t h e i r  lower operat ing c o s t s  might 
s t i l l  make them a t t r a c t i v e  i n  count r ies  with good s i t e s  and where e a r t h  
dam cons t ruc t ion  may s t i l l  be done cheaply. 
B. Pumping S ta t ions  
The second type of system v i s i t e d  were pumping s t a t i o n s  wherein water 
was pumped d i r e c t l y  from r i v e r s  o r  from feeder  canals  supplied from 
r ive r s .  The water was e i t h e r  pumped d i r e c t l y  t o  a main canal  o r  i n t o  
l a rge  concrete  flumes--often r a i sed  some 10 meters o r  more over rav ines  
and which continued alongside h i l l s  u n t i l  t h e  conveyer reached the  paddy 
f i e l d s .  The team v i s i t e d  s i x  of these  systems. They were e i t h e r  a l l  
working we l l  a t  the  time of our v i s i t  o r  were reported a s  funct ioning a l l  
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right. One village at the end of the system reported some water short- 
ages. The system operator said he was expecting rain, and in any event a 
large transformer was being replaced at the time of the visit. It is 
quite possible that these systems do find some difficulty in always 
pleasing everyone at all times. In another village, the farmer complained 
of too much water, as the FLIA had pumped the day before and that night 
there was a heavy rain. It would be extremely doubtful if one could 
optimize use of energy and maximize irrigation requirements as the 
operators would need to have accurate rainfall predictions which simply 
aren't available. 
C. Irrigation and Drainage Systems 
The combination irrigation and drainage systems are primarily 
drainage systems, and one, Ha-nam, was essentially a set of drainage pumps 
which reclaimed 173 hp of swampland. The pumps are at the end of an area, 
which is usually a diked-off portion of a river flood plain. The main 
pumps, and smaller auxiliary pumps, are designed to discharge either to 
the river or a drainage canal. The pumps are also designed to discharge 
to irrigation canals, which begin on the high side of the river control 
dikes, and slope back to the head of the benefited area. In this manner 
drain water is recycled to re-irrigate the dry paddy fields as there is 
usually excess water in the overall system. Korea is fortunate that the 
source of water is rain and there is no salt pick-up from the paddy 
fields. These systems are ingenious and the rice growing areas clearly 
receive marked benefits from both the drainage and irrigation combination. 
The systems visited were all in very good shape. 
The fourth system visited comprised a means to overcome a major 
problem which occurs when irrigation is done from the run-of-the-river 
systems, i.e., systems are dependent upon whatever the current river flows 
happen to be. The problem occurs because at the same time the paddy 
fields dry up--so does the river. The solution, albeit a relatively 
expensive one, is to construct a reservoir and fill it while there is 
adequate river water and release it as needed. The team visited two of 
these systems. One was a reservoir in the hills above the paddy fields 
which required a high water lift and a long concrete flume of a 1000 meter 
to the reservoir. The costs per hectare of this particular system, 
San-Nam, ran at least double other systems and showed a low return because 
of capital costs and the rather low incremental yield increase. The area 
was fairly good rainfed and partially irrigated paddy even before the 
project. Marked benefits occured on 54 out of 320 hectares which were 
converted from upland to paddy. The second pumplreservoir system was at 
an old tideland reclamation site, Gun-am, which was never productive from 
using small run-of-the-river pumps. 
A portion of paddy land was diked off to make a reservoir and this is 
filled and released to irrigate fully and control sea water intrusion of 
the paddy area. Because the water lift is low and the pump is directly at 
the reservoir, both capital costs and operational costs are relatively low 
compared to the San-Nam site. Both systems were working well and the 
effective irrigation system for Gum-am was in the low range of unit costs 
per hectare--$1,753/hectare versus $4,578 for San-Nam. 
Although not entirely without problems (three electric motors were 
mounted improperly and "vibrated" to death in five years versus an 
expected 25-30 year life expectancy) the systems visited were apparently 
of good design, well constructed, well maintained and properly operated. 
The farmers, the FLIA and the Agricultural Development Corporation are to 
be congratulated. 
No assessment, per se, was made of the on-farm water management 
aspect of the irrigation systems. Such assessment was implicitly included 
in the overall farm management and production system. With Korean rice 
yields among the highest in the world and equal to or exceeding those of 
many experiment stations it implies that most management functions are 
well done. This is not to say that improvements in water and other 
efficiencies cannot be achieved, but there are no glaring inefficiencies. 
11. Economics of the Irrigation and Farming System 
There are several measures by which one can estimate the viability of 
an investment to the economy as a whole and to participating farmers. 
The Korea irrigation project paper prepared by USAID/Korea used two 
IRR measures for each irrigation area (subproject): an incremental IRR 
and a financial IRR. The paper does not present an economic IRR which is 
in many respects the most interesting of the various IRR's, at least to 
the developmental community. 
The calculation of an incremental IRR simply ignores sunk costs in 
the sub-projects, all of which had some construction started. Naturally 
the incremental IRR, or return on the remaining investment, is high since 
it attributes nothing to the initial investments and, in effect, all 
returns are to the final tranche of money. This measure may be of 
interest to a finance minister in that it tells him to finish off 
partially completed projects before starting new ones. It doesn't tell 
him whether the project should have been started in the first place or 
even whether he should cut potential losses and abandon the project. For 
those decisions one needs economic analysis and financial analysis. 
The project paper provides financial analysis which uses 1974 prices 
for costs of production, costs of construction, and costs for operation 
and maintenance of the irrigation systems. It used projected prices for 
rice and barley. The calculated financial IRR's show a respectable return 
and indicate the total project to be financially sound for participating 
farmers, for the Farmland Improvement Associations, and for the central 
government which provided the bulk of the capital for each of the 
respective sub-projects which collectively constitute the total project. 
The calculation of the economic IRR was not done. This is now stan- 
dard practice for A.I.D. projects as such calculations use international 
values for items which are traded internationally and full (unsubsidized) 
values for local costs items. Such calculations provide planners and 
development agencies with uniform standards whereby they may be better 
able to choose among projects. If these calculations had been done in the 
particular case of Korean small-scale irrigation, they would tell whether 
the government may have been better advised to import cereals and use 
investment funds for industrialization projects that may have higher IRR's 
and employment generation effects. 
The financial IRR used a projected rice price of $355/mt in the 1974 
calculations. As it turns out, the price of rice, landed in Korea, in the 
past few years (1972-1979) has been about just at $360 so the financial, 
projected price and real price for the main item of benefits turned out to 
be rather amazingly close. 
A recent study by the Korean Rural Economics Institute computed 
financial and economic IRR's in IBRD-assisted small-scale irrigation 
projects which are similar to the ones A.I.D. financed (Oh, Ho Sung). 
This study found economic IRR's of 16.6 percent using domestic prices and 
12.4 percent using international prices, thus the financial IRR's indica- 
ted about a 25 percent overestimate from economic IRR's. It appears the 
financial IRR may overstate the economic viability of the project 
somewhat, but even so the projects are economic by both domestic and 
international measures. 
The sensitivity analysis provided in the project paper provides 
insights into different pricing and cost scenarios but it would have 
greatly enhanced decision making regarding project approvals had economic 
analysis been done in the first instance. Such analysis, in the project 
design stage, would also be very useful for project evaluation purposes. 
In addition to the evaluation by Dr. Oh (Oh, 1979) of the ROKGIIBRD- 
financed small- and medium-scale irrigation projects, Dr. Martin E. 
Hanratty (Michigan State University formerly with the A.1.D.-financed 
Korean Agricultural Assistance Planning Project) analyzed some of the 55 
ROKG/A.I.D. Irrigation Projects. His study took place in 1976. Two of 
Hanratty's sites, Gun-am and Do-bong were visited by the AID/W Impact 
Evaluation Study Team. Hanratty's economic IRR's ranged from 8.56 to 
19.39 at international prices and from 13.21 to 29.48 at domestic prices. 
The survey team found Gun-am and Do-bong to have the same relative 
standing as Hanratty did with respect to apparent viability. The impact 
team did not attempt to recalculate IRR's because one needs construction 
costs and schedules, operational and maintenance costs plus farm budgets 
for a lengthy time series and all costs and benefit streams discounted to 
the present. Most importantly, one would need to know the marginal cost 
to produce the new increments of rice attributable to a new irrigation 
system. Neither the data base nor time permitted re-doing the IRR's. 
Rather, a "rapid rural appraisal" technique of estimating total capital 
costs recovery was used to obtain an approximation of whether the farming 
system could have sustained the original investments in the irrigation 
improvements. The estimate was made using assumptions that the farmers 
took out a loan covering the total investment costs of their particular 
system at 25 years to amortize pumps and 30 years to amortize dams. The 
rate of interests was assumed to be 12 percent. The annual payment was 
calculated in terms of metric tons of rice at domestic prices and at 
international prices. Table 1 shows how much of farmers' new 
production--from the i r r i g a t i o n  systems and assoc ia ted  inputs--would be 
needed to  repay the  100 percent c a p i t a l  cost  loan. It a l s o  shows how much 
of the  t o t a l  production, r a t h e r  than the new increment would have t o  be 
used t o  repay the loan. With the exception of the  land reclamation type 
p ro jec t ,  Ha-Nan, and San-Nan (a  type of pro jec t  with a s e t  of pumps, a 
long flume and a r e se rvo i r )  i t  appears farmers should be ab le  t o  pay the  
c a p i t a l  c o s t s  of t h e i r  i r r i g a t i o n .  They a r e  now paying only 10 percent of 
c a p i t a l  cos ts .  They pay almost a l l  of the  opera t ion  and maintenance 
cos t s ,  the  exceptions being d i e s e l  f u e l  and e l e c t r i c i t y  which a r e  
subsidized. With cur rent  high r i c e  p r i c e  support,  f u l l  c o s t s  could most 
l i k e l y  be paid fo r  energy. 
A t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i ces ,  which a r e  about ha l f  of t h e  domestic p r i c e  
l e v e l ,  the percentage of a crop needed t o  repay t h e  loan about doubles the  
r i c e  payments amor t iza t ion ,  but even when i n t e r n a t i o n a l  input  p r i ces  a s  
well  a s  output p r i ces  a r e  used (oh, Hanrat ty) ,  the  p r o j e c t s  s t i l l  appear 
economic. 
Oh and Hanrat ty 's  pos i t i ve  economic I R R ' s  imply t h a t  incremental 
production comes a t  low c o s t s  and has correspondingly high bene f i t s .  This 
is  because almost a l l  f ixed  and va r i ab le  cos t s  of r a i s i n g  a crop a r e  
embodied i n  the bas i c  land prepara t ion ,  plant ing and f e r t i l i z a t i o n  and 
harvest ing operat ion.  Adding the  annualized i r r i g a t i o n  c o s t s  and a l i t t l e  
f e r t i l i z e r  and harvest ing expenses thus y ie ld  a good r e tu rn ,  over time. 
Hence t h e i r  analyses show t h a t  the pro jec t  i s  economic t o  the  soc ie ty .  
This i s  not t o  imply t h a t  c a p i t a l  and o ther  c o s t s  could be recovered 
e a s i l y .  As  a p r a c t i c a l  matter ,  a c t u a l  recovery of c a p i t a l  c o s t s  is  not 
attempted because even though c o s t s  and r e tu rns  show new marginal 
increments of r i c e  a r e  produced very p ro f i t ab ly ,  i t  i s  na t iona l  average 
c o s t s  of production which a r e  used t o  s e t  support p r i ces  and a re  t h e  
f i g u r e s  used throughout the  government agencies. The average c o s t s  per 
ton of r i c e  a r e  much higher  than a r e  marginal c o s t s  i m p l i c i t  i n  economic 
ana lys i s  of a p a r t i c u l a r  i r r i g a t i o n  system. Thus t o  c o l l e c t  c a p i t a l  and 
operat ing c o s t s ,  t h e  government would have t o  demonstrate s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  
t o  farmers t h a t  t h e i r  new system was more p r o f i t a b l e  than a l l  neighboring 
systems, o r  r a i s e  everyone's water f ees  s u b s t a n t i a l l y ,  thus reducing r e a l  
farm income, which i s  counter t o  the  government's objec t ives .  
I n  summary, economic analyses by Oh and Hanratty i n d i c a t e  most of t h e  
p r o j e t s  a r e  economic, i f  one accepts  a port ion of the  p ro jec t s  with r a t h e r  
low 1RR's--in the  8-10 percent range. Capital  cos t  recovery es t imates  a t  
the p r i ces  prevai l ing  i n  Korea ind ica t e  the  p ro jec t s  could amortize a l l  
investment c o s t s  with t h e  poss ib le  exception of a land reclamation 
project .  

Estimate of The Farming System's Capabili ty t o  Repay The I r r i g a t i o n  Investment 
Units i n  Mt/Ha 
Product ion 
Increase a f t e r  
Project (UtIRa) 
Tota l  
Production 
(UtlRa) 
Domestic Prices.  1979 
of RiceIHa X of 
t o  Repay 100% Incremental 
Costa Production 
% of Total  
Production 
6% 
6% 
7% 
17% 
12% 
35% 
Name T Y F  
Gun-Am Pump & Reservoir 
Yeo-Ju River Pump 
Keum-Dong II 
San-Nam Pump & Reservoir 
Mae-Ho pump 
Ha-Nam DrainIIrr .  Pump 
Land Reclamation 
No pr ior  r i c e  4.6 1.6 No pr ior  crops 
Chang-Woon DrainIIrr .  Pump 
Jang-Yoo Irr. Pump 
Yoon-Nae DrainIIrr .  Pump 
Hyung-Kwan Dam 
Ku-Nam Dam 
Do-Bong D m  
Se-Do Irr. Pump 
14. Yeo-Su 2 Staged Pump 2.1 4.0 .48 23% 12% 
111. The Farmland Improvement Associations 
For the small- and medium-scale systems the county level Farm Land 
Improvement Associations (FLIA) accept full responsibility for operation 
and maintenance of the systems. They collect funds--through a farmer 
membership fee--for the administration, depreciation, education1 
demonstration, contingency and operation and maintenance connected with 
the system. The FLIAs all have massive records on their systems and they 
have an annual balance sheet which breaks income and expenses down by 
source and use. The income is usually about 80 percent from membership 
(water) fees and about 16 percent from interest earnings on the deprecia- 
tion funds, the balance, 3 or 4 percent, is from the central government, 
unless major new construction is underway, in which case the ROKG con- 
tribution would be bigger. The expenditure pattern is usually about 40 
percent for operation and maintenance, 25 percent for administration and 
salaries of water tenders, 10 percent for loan repayments, with the 
balance spread among education/demonstration, contingencies, and savings 
(depreciation). The membership fees are about $215 per hectare, about 
four times the national average, as apparently the old national systems 
are very efficient on both capital and operating costs or are being more 
heavily subsidized than are the systems under study. The subsidy comes 
through the government's recovering only 10 percent of capital costs and 
only a portion--maybe half--of energy costs. Even so the range of water 
changes, $144 to $294 per hectare, are high by world standards and are 
sustainable by the high rice price. If farms were large, and net farm 
income therefore substantial, the systems could probably pay all capital, 
operation, and maintenance charges under the Korean price policy. However 
because of the small size of the farm and correspondingly the small 
absolute net income per farm, the government simply chooses to underwrite 
a portion of the costs of the systems--as does the United States for even 
very large farms. 
On balance the FLIAs and the farmers are doing a very good job in 
operating the systems, in paying water charges and general management of 
their collective responsibilities. 
IV. Land Leasing Arrangements 
Land leasing arrangements being the result of the interaction of land 
availability and the number of people wanting to farm, costs of pro- 
duction, and commodity pricing are indicators of the profitability of 
farming. In Korea it now appears that returns to land ownership are very 
favorable, and even renting in land at seemingly steep rents seems 
prof itable. 
One of the team's first inquiries about rents revealed a situation in 
which the respondent said he paid 100 percent of the rice to the landowner 
and the farmer furnished all inputs. Since this was an obviously 
impossible situation, we probed. It turned out that the farmer then 
received the use of the rice land, rent free, for winter vinyl crop 
production. It was further revealed that the rent was a fixed rent, in 
kind, of about 3.6 mt of rice per hectare or about three fourths of 
expected production, still a substantial rent for rice land. 
The usual  r e n t  is one ha l f  of t h e  a c t u a l  production with the  farmer 
furn ish ing  a l l  inputs.  Occasionally t h e  landowner may pay one half  the  
water charges. In  many terms, a t  domestic p r i ces ,  t h i s  t u rns  out  t o  be 
very i n t e r e s t i n g  i f  one owned s i g n i f i c a n t  r i c e  lands. The government's 
1978 r i c e  p r i ce  of $792 m t  is apparent ly ca l cu la t ed  using 1978 cos t  of 
production f igu res  of $552 a metr ic  ton plus a  p r o f i t  margin f igu re  of 
$240. (The 1979 f i g u r e s  of $762/mt a r e  a  l i t t l e  l e s s  using a  s l i g h t l y  
l e s s  favorable r a t e  of exchange.) The c o s t s  of production a r e  ca l cu la t ed  
with about one ha l f  going f o r  labor  and out-of-pocket c o s t s  of seed,  
f e r t i l i z e r s ,  pes t  con t ro l ,  f u e l ,  and machinery deprec ia t ion ,  and one ha l f  
going f o r  r e tu rns  t o  land and c a p i t a l .  The r e n t a l  system of 50150 thus  
g ives  a  r e tu rn  t o  land of about $396/ha, and $396 t o  the  farmer t o  cover 
h i s  $276 out-of-pocket c o s t s  and a  $120 r e t u r n  t o  h i s  labor.  The p r a c t i c e  
of s e t t i n g  support p r i ces  which cover a l l  c o s t s  and with a  r e t u r n  f o r  - land 
and labor plus a  p r o f i t  margin makes Korean farmers the  envy of U.S. 
farmers whose t a r g e t  p r i ce  programs use cos t  of production e t imates  but 
without a  s imi l a r  r e tu rn  t o  land o r  s imi l a r  p r o f i t  margins. Rice lands i n  
Miss iss ippi  rented f o r  only $125/ha i n  1979 versus an implied $397 r e n t  i n  
Korea. Although t h e  two coun t r i e s  c o s t / p r i c e  s t r u c t u r e s  and farming 
systems a r e  very d i f f e r e n t ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  the  Korean government has an 
e f f e c t i v e  income t r a n s f e r  mechanism i n  place f o r  r i c e  land owners v i a  t h e  
high r i c e  p r i ce  policy. 
APPENDIX D 
NOTES ON CHANGES I N  THE ROLE OF WOMEN AND I N  FAMILY WELFARE 
Ingrid P a l m e r  
Notes on Changes in the Role of Women and in Family We_l.fse_ 
Women in the villages of Korea cannot be compared with their counter- 
parts in third world countries. Their physical appearance is good: there 
are no signs of calorie deficiency or marked premature aging and they do 
not have an exhausted, haggard look about them. Nor do they appear to be 
constantly working. The evaluation was admittedly undertaken during a 
relatively slack labour period when many women were sitting around 
talking, with some of them complaining of lack of wage employment. The 
nearest health center is usually 4 to 10 kilometers away and its services, 
notably those of family planning, well known to all the women. 
The main areas of concern about women's position as the countryside 
undergoes transition lie in discriminatory agricultural labor and in 
access to decisionmaking. The drive towards children's education, 
material acquisition and upward social mobility allow men's and women's 
interests to coincide at many points, but they also mask the unques- 
tionable family patriarchy and women's unequal position in decision-making 
on the allocation of resources. Undertones of Confucian influence still 
pervade and are likely to be invoked if there is a clear conflict between 
men's and women's interest. 
The intensification of rice cultivation following irrigation obliges 
greater care on some field tasks and allows mechanization of others to be 
profitable. As has been observed in other countries, the typically 
female-typed jobs of transplanting and weeding require more effort, 
although herbicides are rapidly taking over the job of labor in the 
latter. But the male-typed task of land preparation is now widely 
undertaken by power tillers which are also used for transportation. 
Pesticide spraying is a new cultivation task which, requiring a piece of 
machinery, has been appropriated by men in the usual manner. But it is a 
solitary task and so does not require a massed labor force like trans- 
planting. 
The decline in the demand for male labor appears to be clearly 
greater than the decline in the supply of male labor through the greater 
attendance of boys at school. Rut several women pointed out that their 
work has been made harder by more girls going to school. When asked how 
long ago their agricultural workload started to increase, they mentioned 
five to six years ago, which coincides with the completion of the irriga- 
tion projects. There were some women from the better-off farming families 
who do little or no work in the fields and their numbers have probably 
increased with rises in income. There is a measure of exchange labor for 
transplanting but more often the women organize it on a collective basis 
and sometimes subtract an amount from their collective wage, which they 
explained with some pride, goes to the women's club. 
The shift in the relative demand for the sexes' labor is narrowing 
the gap between men's and women's wages a little, but this process is 
probably slowed by the gender-specifity of the jobs so that the labor 
market is very differentiated. A common quote was W4,000 a day for men 
(sometimes with three meals during harvesting) W3,000 for women (with one 
Previous Page Blank 
meal included). In one prosperous village it was said that both sexes 
earned W4,000 a day for transplanting, but since this is almost entirely 
women's work some caution is needed in interpreting this. More signifi- 
cant is that the same wage was paid to both sexes for harvesting. Yet for 
"other jobs" W4.000 was paid to men (for spraying) and W3,000 to women 
(for weeding). If there is a trend, it is that women's earnings are 
moving up from two-thirds to three-quarters of men's. 
The seasonal peak demand for female labor still presents the problem 
of organizing domestic work as well. Midday meals are usually arranged by 
taking cold noodles or rice to the fields, but it is a sufficiently 
important issue for women's clubs to consider using their funds to 
establish cooking facilities in the village to cook and sell food to the 
workers. Another problem is breast-feeding. One landless woman claimed 
she had put all four of her children on (what she essentially admitted to 
be diluted) powdered milk from birth as breast-feeding interfered with her 
employment. 
Korea is far from being unique in arranging land reform between male 
heads of household, leaving adult women in the legal position of children 
in relation to the lard. The usual consequences are seen in Korea: women 
are not members of farmers' cooperatives or of the Farm Land Improvement 
Associations in their own right. Thus, inevitably, they have associate 
status in FLIA meetings, which they can 'attend. More important is that 
the earnings from the rice crop come under the control of their husbands. 
It was admitted during interviews that women sometimes had difficulty 
obtaining cash from husbands for their requirements. 
Rights to land directly affect widows who share the inheritance with 
children. Problems can occur if the children have migrated and if their 
wishes on disposal of the land should differ from their mother's. In 
theory, land is inherited equally by sons and daughters. There is 
evidence, however, that sons emerge as land operators, and it is not clear 
to what extent their sisters are compensated. 
Families, especially women, are clearly benefiting from fertility 
control. Family planning is widely accepted and the means of fertility 
control are generally known. The usual complaints of nausea from the 
contraceptive pill and backache from the IUD were heard frequently. An 
increasing number of both men and women are turning to sterilization but 
there is still hesitation about this operation. One rumour heard was that 
sterilization reduces the life expectancy of men. There is no inhibition 
about openly discussing birth control and abortion, and during one inter- 
view with some women, a man approached to say that his wife who was 
thirteen weeks pregnant had failed in an attempt to abort herself and what 
should she do. There is a great deal of mutual support amongst the women 
regarding family planning. In one case, a leader of the women's club 
organized an abortion and an IUD insertion for a woman who obviously could 
not cope with life generally. 
Aspirations about family size center on having 2 to 4 children with 
the better-off families tending to settle for fewer than the poor 
families. This fits with studies of the relationship between income and 
fertility. But two specific comments in causal relationships in Korea can 
be made. Firstly. higher income families see higher education for their 
children within their reach and, in the education-conscious context of 
Korean society, are prepared to invest unusually heavily in education and 
its promise of upward economic and social mobility. In this respect their 
aspirations accord with some of the theoretical literature on population 
to the effect that higher income families invest in children as in an 
expensive consumer durable rather than in the labor of young children. 
However, there is stark evidence that educational expenditure does not 
compete with expenditure on household consumer durable6 but rather with 
expenditure on the socially invisible items of nutrition and home techni- 
cal improvements to relieve women's drudgery. This conflicts with some 
other theories such that better nutrition of young children and raising 
the status of women are means to encouraging lower fertility. These 
unexpected findings could be explained by the Korean cultural--and already 
high life expectancy--context. 
Secondly, the desire of poorer families to retain comparatively large 
families may be a reflection of their expectations of needing to rely on 
child labor or earnings during part of the family life cycle as well as on 
the security of a number of surviving lorincome earning children for 
parents' old age. While the poor wanted education for their children, 
many did not have real expectations of financing even middle school 
education. 
One subject of well-being stood out prominently as bearing no rela- 
tion to income changes. The poorest and the most prosperous mothers 
weaned their infants in the same way: at eight months the child was given 
rice soup and later on what the adults had. Not one of the almost 50 
women spoken with had ever given their babies eggs. It was incongruous to 
sit in the living room of a house with radio, television, rice cooker and 
electric fan, and with chickens running around in the compound, and hear 
this. The older children appeared well proportioned but visual inspection 
suggested that the upper arm measurement test of nutrition amongst the 
under-twos would show a deficiency. 
The absence of weaning foods can hardly be put down to fecklessness 
on the part of mothers for there is no sign of this in other aspects of 
child care. There may be a belief that babies grow on their own accord 
and that nothing else is required. But it also reveals a gap in the 
services of the health centers. The term "m5ternal and child health" 
appears unknown in the villages and this may signify a lack of information 
dissemination on infant nutrition. 
The women were well aware of the superiority of mother's milk, but 
this did not atop the almost universal use of powdered milk as supple- 
nentary feeding, and in same cases it was substituted for breast-feeding 
sooner or later. 
The increase in income enjoyed as a result of the irrigation is 
evident in the urban goods seen in the houses. The order of priority 
purchasing seems to be radio, television, followed by either rice 
cooker or electric fan, and a few houses had a refrigerator. In one 
village every household was said to have a bottled gas stove but these 
were not used because of the high price of gas. Wood was still widely 
used as a cooking fuel with coal briquettes used by a minority. It was a 
little difficult to appreciate the reasons for purchasing a television at 
around W90,000 before a rice cooker costing W17,OOO. One woman explained 
that after working hard during the day it was necessary to relax in front 
of the television. Another said it relieved boredom. There are different 
views on how labor-saving the rice cooker actually is. But one is left 
wondering whether a television would come before a rice cooker in a 
woman-headed household. 
Cleanliness is very important to Koreans and new washing points, 
individual compound wells and taps, have figured in Sae-maul construction 
where the movement has been active. But in villages not affected by the 
movement, household income gains are not generally used privately or 
collectively to improve the domestic water supply. Only the most 
prosperous farming families have undertaken their own private investment 
in water, in one case commandeering one of the two village wells and 
constructing a concrete platform--and wall--around it. Boys are free of 
domestic tasks but girls help their mothers, especially in the washing of 
clothes. 
Nutrition improvements have come by way of more vegetables consumed 
and more frequent meat-eating. But in one village with an irrigation 
project, it was said that even the richest villagers ate meat only a few 
times a year. In this village about a third of the households had televi- 
sion. The impression was gained that television and electric fans were 
ranked higher than nutrition, and consequently that the satisfaction of 
basic needs would be seen differently by villagers and development 
planners. 
Education is obviously the main prize of agricultural improvements. 
Parents borrow for education to an extent probably matched only by 
borrowing for agricultural production. More and more children are 
finishing middle school and high school, and although sons are given 
preference in education when finance is tight, there are no cultural 
inhibitions about educating daughters. Noticeable evidence of the 
favoring of boys in expenditure patterns comes from the streams of school 
boys on bicycles while their sisters almost all walk to school. 
In the past, it was the great expansion of urban industry and the 
wide disparity between urban and rural earnings which prompted migration 
(especially of the young and poorly-educated). Today, although rural 
residents are unanimous in believing their standard of living would be 
higher in the cities, it is the great promise of class advancement from 
joining education with urban status that is the main spur. 
Although women interviewed all agreed that they wanted their children 
to leave the countryside, some expressed anxiety over their daughters' 
lives in the cities. "Falling into bad ways" was uppermost in their 
minds. There was some evidence that migrant children weakened their links 
with their village homes after a time, and failed to visit them for long 
periods. Even so, some mothers maintained they especially wanted to get 
their daughters out of agriculture because it was so hard. All the young 
unmarried women interviewed were adamant that they did not want to marry a 
farmer. 
A number of respondents commented that only the poor and the old 
would be eventually left in the villages. Unless there is a serious and 
prolonged industrial recession, this migration must be seen as permanent. 
In this case the agrarian, and therefore the social, structure in the 
villages will change. Land for sale will probably become concentrated in 
the largest farms, as might part of the land rented out by absentee land- 
lords. The smallest farms may well persist if the comments of villagers 
that only the poor and old will stay behind prove true. Even if there is 
not an industrial recession, it is unlikely that in the foreseeable future 
urban areas will be able to absorb easily all the migrant flow. Level of 
education will become the device for rationing out jobs with the usual 
result that most are over-educated for the jobs they get. 
A degree of farm size and social polarization might then set in the 
next generation. The progress of landless and very small farm income and 
household welfare will depend on forms of farm mechanization and the main- 
tenance of the rice price support. 
Both sexes lacked opportunities to participate in decision-making on 
village-level allocation of resources and the design of irrigation pro- 
jects. Even the men did not seem to be active in making requests or 
arguing with higher-level decisions in the farmers' cooperative and FLIA 
meetings. But in other social events, such as drinking and village 
festivities, there is discrimination or segregation between the sexes. 
The men on the evaluation team, concentrating on male residents, were 
frequently invited to join in the drinking of alcoholic brews. But none 
of the fenale residents appeared to be drinking when they were approached. 
There remains one question. Do women exercise any civic function in 
a segregated manner within their own clubs? The answer is "Yes, but in a 
very low social profile, and their potential receives no official 
encouragement. Moreover, their co-option by the Sae-maul Movement some- 
times gives the kiss of death to their former activities". At the start 
of the Sae-maul Movement in 1971-1972, a large number of villages had 
women's credit unions. The sources of funds were twofold: a little 
uncooked rice was placed in a pot by wives at every meal and the 
accumulated quantity sold by the unions; and transplanting was often 
performed collectively with part of the total wages bill placed in the 
women's credit union/club. (One village club had raised W1.5 million, or 
$2,500, from the former practice.) The money was sometimes used to feed 
those working on Sae-maul construction projects or for Sae-maul beautifi- 
cation activities, a form of subsidy provided by the women. More 
generally the funds are loaned out (at 4 percent to 5 percent a month--the 
market rate) to anybody, including "the poor people". It became evident 
in at least two villages that the women's clubs were supplying farm 
working capital on credit to the poorest families. Thus, far from the 
rice intensification advancing women, women were supporting marginal 
farmers in rice intensification. 
During the evaluation women were asked what they would like their 
clubs to do. There were two common answers: one, to provide kitchen 
facilities to cook and sell lunches for those working in the field at peak 
labor periods; two, to start a village bank. The impression was gained 
that women's clubs were shrewd in accumulating funds but sometimes 
frittered them away or allowed the Sae-maul movement to spend them. One 
outlet has been to invest in a village store and appoint a manageress who 
then takes all the profit (or loss) as salary. 
Other activities of the women's clubs include disseminating informa- 
tion on infants' vaccinations and on family planning. They also sometimes 
keep an eye on women who show signs of not being able to cope. But there 
are also villages, including those that have benefited from irrigation, 
where there are only nominal women's clubs or none at all. 
In conclusion it can be said that household welfare has enjoyed 
improvement since the irrigation schemes were completed but the advances 
in the satisfication of basic needs have not particularly favoured the 
most vulnerable household members or social groups. It is also difficult 
to identify any factors which have raised the social status of women. 
APPENDIX E 
A PRELIMINARY PROFILE OF KOREAN FARMERS AND THEIR VILLAGES 
by 
K i m  D o n g - I 1  
A Preliminary P r o f i l e  of Korean Farmers and Their Vi l l ages  
During the  period of May 6-15, 1980, the  Korea Rural Economics 
I n s t i t u t e  c a r r i e d  out a s o c i a l  survey funded by USAID t o  evalua te ,  from a 
soc io log ica l  perspect ive,  t h e  e f f e c t s  of A.I .D. ' s  66 small- and medium- 
s c a l e  water p ro jec t s  on r u r a l  ~ 0 r e a . l  Out of 66 p ro jec t  a reas .  16 were 
chosen a s  sample s i t e s  f o r  the  survey. I n  the  sampling areas ,  60 v i l l a g e s  
which were regarded a s  benef ic iary  areas  were included, and 30 more 
v i l l a g e s  outs ide  the p ro jec t  a r e a s  were added a s  quasi-control groups i n  
our ~ u r v e y . ~  Since we interviewed one v i l l a g e  leader  o r  knowledgeable 
person and f i v e  o ther  randomly se lec ted  r e s iden t s  (heads of household o r  
t h e i r  spouses) from each v i l l a g e ,  the  t o t a l  sample s i z e  of respondents 
amounted to  540 persons. About one t h i r d  of these  respondents were women. 
I n  t h i s  paper the  w r i t e r  w i l l  provide a p r o f i l e  of r u r a l  people i n  
the  sampling areas.  Also, included here i s  a shor t  desc r ip t ion  of r u r a l  
change t h a t  has occurred i n  the sample s i t e s  during t h e  past  f i v e  t o  s i x  
year period. Describing s o c i a l  change, which includes human change a s  
w e l l  as  organiza t ional  o r  s t r u c t u r a l  change, i s  not an easy task. How 
ever,  the w r i t e r  w i l l  attempt t o  p r o f i l e  r u r a l  people and t h e i r  changing 
l i f e  based on the data co l l ec ted  by our interviews with r u r a l  people using 
a standard quest ionnaire.  
Rapid urbanizat ion and i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  occurring recent ly  i n  Korea 
has caused a heavy migrat ion of farmers, e spec ia l ly  younger ones, t o  urban 
areas.  I n  consequence, the  number of r u r a l  farmers has decreased sub- 
s t a n t i a l l y  during the pas t  ten years  and the mean age of r u r a l  r e s iden t s  
has gone up s t ead i ly .  In  the  p ro jec t  a reas  surveyed, those who were more 
than 50 years  old were 37 percent of the t o t a l  population, while t h i s  
f igu re  was 30 percent i n  non-project areas.  The l e v e l  of education a l s o  
shows somewhat of a d i f f e rence  between the  two areas.  In  the p ro jec t  
a reas  the  majori ty (70 percent)  had elementary school education o r  l e s s  
and only 10 percent had high school education. I n  the  non-project a rea  18 
percent had a t  l e a s t  a high school education. 
Other d i f ferences  were a l s o  observed between the  pro jec t  a reas  and 
non-project v i l l ages .  For example, the  proportion of r e s iden t s  who owned 
a t e l ev i s ion  s e t  was 86 percent i n  the pro jec t  a reas  and about the  same 
proport ion (88 percent)  had the  same item i n  the  non-project a reas .  When 
we asked i f  they owned a r e f r i g e r a t o r ,  11 percent i n  the  pro jec t  a reas  and 
19 percent from the  non-project a reas  sa id  yes. Thus, we can t e l l  t h a t  
the l i v i n g  standard i n  the  non-project a reas  i s  s l i g h t l y  higher than t h a t  
i n  the p ro jec t  a reas .  I n  the  pro jec t  a reas  over 60 percent of the res ident  
fami l ies  had an annual income of l e s s  than 2 mi l l ion  won (about 3,300 i n  
U.S. d o l l a r s ) ,  whereas i n  the  non-project a reas  50 percent had an income 
of l e s s  than 2 mi l l ion  won. 
1sixty-six p ro jec t s  were o r i g i n a l l y  planned f o r  A.I.D. support. (Edi tor )  
2 ~ o n p r o j e c t  a reas  a r e  v i l l a g e s  c lose  t o  p ro jec t  s i t e s  and a l s o  have 
i r r i g a t e d  paddy. The purpose of d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  between these groups was 
to a s c e r t a i n  the s o c i a l  impact of the FLIA. (Edi tor )  
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Thus, when we compare t h e  o v e r a l l  socio-economic s t a t u s  of t h e  
p ro jec t  a rea  r e s i d e n t s  with t h a t  of t h e  non-project a rea ,  we can t e l l  t h a t  
the former i s  somewhat lower than t h e  l a t t e r .  This i s  an i n t e r e s t i n g  
f inding  i n  t h e  sense t h a t  farmers i n  the p ro jec t  a rea  have a higher  
proportion of i r r i g a t e d  land than those i n  the  non-project areas.  Perhaps 
the  p ro jec t  v i l l a g e  people had a f a r  lower socio-economic s t a t u s  because 
of unfavorable n a t u r a l  condi t ions  than those i n  non-project a reas  before 
the  p ro jec t  and they need more time t o  catch up with neighborhood v i l l a g e  
res idents .  3 
F ina l ly ,  when we asked respondents what t h e i r  socio-economic s t a t u s  
(SES) was i n  the v i l l a g e s  from t h e i r  own se l f -evalua t ions ,  22 percent  of 
the  r e s iden t s  i n  the  p ro jec t  a r e a s  regarded themselves a s  having lower 
s t a t u s ,  16 percent bel ieved they belong t o  the  group of higher  socio- 
economic s t a t u s ,  and the  r e s t  of them (62 percent )  sa id  they a r e  middle 
c l a s s  people i n  t h e i r  v i l l a g e s .  A s i m i l a r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of socio-economic 
s t a t u s  was observed i n  the non-project a r e a s  (24 percent lower s t a t u s ,  60 
percent middle, and 16 percent upper s t a t u s ) .  Also, w e  asked what t h e i r  
s t a t u s  was f i v e  t o  s i x  years ago. I n  both p ro jec t  and non-project a reas  
the  same proport ion (16 percent )  bel ieved they were people of upper s t a t u s  
f i v e  to s i x  years  ago. However. 28 percent i n  the p ro jec t  a r e a s  and 32 
percent i n  the  non-project a r e a s  believed they were those of low s t a t u s  
f i v e  t o  s i x  years  ago. This means more people i n  the  non-project a r e a s  
be l ieve  they have moved t o  middle c l a s s  from lower c l a s s  i n  t h e  pas t  f i v e  
t o  s i x  years than those  i n  the  p ro jec t  areas.  This f inding  is a l s o  
i n t e r e s t i n g l y  cons i s t en t  with the  above f inding  t h a t  the o v e r a l l  
socioeconomic s t a t u s  of t h e  non-project a rea  r e s i d e n t s  i s  higher  than t h a t  
of the  p ro jec t  a rea  farmers. The w r i t e r  i s  not s u r e  why t h i s  i s  t h e  case. 
Five or  s i x  years  ago before the water p r o j e c t ,  many of the  p ro jec t  a rea  
v i l l a g e s  were deprived areas  mainly because of t h e i r  h e a l t h  environmental 
condit ions where they had t o  r e l y  mainly on r a i n f a l l  or  o the r  n a t u r a l  
condi t ions  f o r  t h e i r  farming. With the  completion of i r r i g a t i o n  o r  
drainage p ro jec t s ,  the  majori ty of t h e  farmers i n  the  p ro jec t  a reas  can 
c u l t i v a t e  t h e i r  land with l e s s  worry about water problems. In  f a c t ,  a s  
mentioned e a r l i e r ,  a  l a r g e r  number of farmers own or  c u l t i v a t e  paddy lands 
with b e t t e r  i r r i g a t i o n  or  drainage systems i n  the pro jec t  a rea  nowadays 
than those i n  the  non-project a reas .  
Logica l ly ,  then,  r e s iden t s  i n  the  pro jec t  a reas  should f e e l  t h a t  
t h e i r  socio-economic condit ion has gone up more than those i n  the  
non-project a reas  i n  t h e  pas t  f i v e  t o  s i x  years. However, a s  it was 
pointed out above, t h i s  i s  not the  case. Maybe a f i v e  o r  s i x  year  period 
is too shor t  f o r  the  r e s iden t s  of the p ro jec t  a rea  to  recognize t h e  
o v e r a l l  socio-economic impact of the  pro jec t  on t h e i r  l i f e .  
However, gn a l t e r n a t i v e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  plausible.  With the 
completion of the water pro jec t  and increas ing  y ie lds  fo  paddy o r  o t h e r  
crops,  t h e i r  hopes r i s e  more r ap id ly  than r e a l i t y .  Thus, rapid ly  r i s i n g  
expectat ions may have caused t h e  farmer t o  f e e l  l e s s  improvement of t h e i r  
3 ~ r r i g a t i o n  on non-project a r e a s  was o lde r ,  and thus income and 
education were higher.  (Edi tor )  
l i v i n g  standard than tha t  which a c t u a l l y  happened. This may expla in  
f inding  t h a t  24 percent of the  pro jec t  a rea  r e s iden t s  f e e l  they w i l l  
a t t a i n  upper c l a s s  s t a t u s  i n  t h e i r  v i l l a g e s  i n  f i v e  years. I n  comparison, 
39 percent of r e s iden t s  i n  non-project a reas  f e e l  the  same way. 
Furthermore, when we asked i f  respondents want t o  move t o  o the r  
places,  30 percent of the  p ro jec t  a rea  r e s iden t s  sa id  yes, i n  comparison 
t o  24 percent i n  the  non-project areas.  O f  course,  the  majori ty of these  
people d e s i r e  t o  move t o  c i t y  areas .  
The d e s i r e  t o  move t o  o the r  places may ind ica te  the  farmer's d is -  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  with t h e i r  work, l i f e ,  o r  community i n  general.  Thus, we 
asked respondents how s a t i s f i e d  (or  d i s s a t i s f i e d )  they were with t h e i r  
o v e r a l l  l i f e  conditions. In both pro jec t  a reas  and norrprojec t  a r e a s  more 
than 50 percent of the  farmers f e e l  t h a t  they a r e  d i s s a t i s f i e d  with t h e i r  
l i v e s .  The somewhat lower degree of l i f e  t h a t  s a t i s f i c a t i o n  among the  
farmers does not necessa r i ly  ind ica te  t h a t  they do not recognize the  
improvement i n  t h e i r  l i f e  condi t ions  i n  the  pas t  f i v e  o r  s i x  years.  In 
f a c t  t he  majori ty of the  farmers (68 percent i n  the  pro jec t  a r e a s  and 76 
percent i n  the  non-project a reas )  f e e l  t h a t  t h e i r  o v e r a l l  l i f e  condi t ions  
have improved during the  pas t  few years. 
On the  o ther  hand, when the  respondents were asked t o  express t h e i r  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  o r  d i s s a t i s f i c a t i o n  with t h e i r  community i n  general ,  t he  
majori ty of r u r a l  r e s iden t s  (72 percent i n  both p ro jec t  and non-project 
a reas)  sa id  tha t  they a r e  s a t i s f i e d  with t h e i r  community. In p a r t i c u l a r ,  
when they were asked t o  provide t h e i r  perception of the  degree of o v e r a l l  
community improvement, most of them (about 90 percent i n  both a reas )  
believed t h a t  t h e i r  community i s  b e t t e r  off now than f i v e  or  s i x  years  
ago. In terms of more s p e c i f i c  items, the  majori ty of Korean r u r a l  people 
bel ieve tha t  o v e r a l l  condit ions i n  t h e i r  housing, t r anspor t a t ion ,  market 
f a c i l i t i e s ,  educat ion,  informal human i n t e r a c t i o n ,  contact  with t h e i r  
r e l a t i v e s ,  and convenience i n  farmwork have improved during the  pas t  few 
years. 
Next, they were asked t o  express t h e i r  perception of change i n  t h e i r  
family income, community pa r t i c ipa t ion ,  work s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  r ec rea t iona l  
a c t i v i t i e s  and medical service.  A l i t t l e  l e s s  than a  half of the  farmers 
bel ieve t h e i r  income has increased during the  f i v e  o r  s i x  year period. 
Rut 23 percent of the  farmers i n  both a reas  f e e l  t h a t  t h e i r  income has 
decreased i n  the  same period. The l e a s t  improvement was found t o  be i n  
the  a reas  of work s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  r ec rea t iona l  f a c i l i t i e s ,  and medical 
service.  
I n  b r i e f ,  farmers i n  both pro jec t  and non-project a reas  f e e l  t h a t  
t he re  has been more improvement i n  some a reas  than i n  o the r  a reas  of t h e i r  
l i f e  o r  community i n  general.  Overal l ,  they be l ieve  tha t  t h e i r  l i f e  has 
got ten  b e t t e r  i n  the pas t  few years. 
However. s ince  farmers i n  both project  and non-project a r e a s  expressed 
s imi la r  opinions regarding change i n  t h e i r  q u a l i t y  of l i f e  i n  the  past  few 
years ,  it i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s o r t  out any d i r e c t  impact of the  water pro jec t  
on the farmers'  percept ion of t h e i r  l i f e  condit ions.  In  order  t o  d e t e c t  
the  farmers'  opinion about the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the water p r o j e c t s  and 
t h e i r  l i f e  condi t ions ,  we asked t o  what ex tent  they thought the  p ro jec t  
cont r ibuted  t o  t h e  increase  i n  t h e i r  income. The majori ty of them 
bel ieved t h a t  the  water pro jec t  had cont r ibuted  to  the  increase  of t h e i r  
family income (41 percent  very much, 30 percent  much, 6 percent  somewhat). 
Also, we asked i f  the cur rent  water f a c i l i t i e s  a r e  adequate f o r  t h e i r  
farming needs. S ix ty  one percent of the  farmers responded p o s i t i v e l y ,  
whereas 39 percent sa id  water f a c i l i t i e s  were adequate i n  the  non-project 
a reas .  
Furthermore, most of t h e  farmers (81 percent )  f e e l  t h a t  the  water 
p ro jec t  cont r ibuted  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t o  the  increase  i n  the community's 
development. A t  p resent ,  the major i ty  of the farmers (80 percent )  i n  the 
p ro jec t  a r eas  belong t o  the Farm Land Improvement Associat ion (FLIA) and 
bene f i t  from the water pro jec t .  A s  mentioned above, the major i ty  of them 
f e e l  t h a t  t h e i r  i r r i g a t i o n  o r  drainage systems a r e  adequate f o r  t h e i r  
farming. They seem t o  approve of t h e  way the  i r r i g a t i o n  systems a r e  
managed by FLIA. Forty seven percent  of the  farmers i n  the  p ro jec t  a r e a s  
sa id  t h a t  they had t o  r e l y  t o t a l l y  on r a i n f a l l  f o r  t h e i r  farming before 
t h e  pro jec t .  With t h e  completion of t h e  p ro jec t ,  the  farmers say,  t h e  
average s i z e  a s  we l l  a s  q u a l i t y  of t h e i r  paddy land improved. Considering 
a l l  of these  ob jec t ive  changes, i t  is not d i f f i c u l t  t o  conclude t h a t  t h e  
farmers i n  t h e  p ro jec t  a r eas  have benef i ted  from the  water p ro jec t  i f  j u s t  
from an economic view point .  
There were problems, too,  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  water pro jec t .  The major i ty  
of the  fanners  (82 percent )  assoc ia ted  with FLIA complained t h a t  the  water 
fee  was too high. Whether such complaints,  a s  expressed by the  farmers,  
a r e  j u s t i f i a b l e  o r  not i s  not the  w r i t e r ' s  concern here. Another problem 
was t h a t  only 40 percent of t h e  farmers signed the pro jec t  con t r ac t  
vo lun ta r i ly .  The r e s t  claimed t h a t  they did not s ign  the  con t rac t  (27 
percent)  or  signed invo lun ta r i ly .  Consistent with t h i s  f inding  i s  t h a t  
only 60 percent  f e l t  t h e i r  opinions were f u l l y  r e f l e c t e d  i n  the  water 
pro jec t .  Thus, we ge t  a  p i c t u r e  t h a t  t h e  community r e s i d e n t s '  pa r t i c ipa -  
t i o n  i n  the  pro jec t  was r e l a t i v e l y  low. 
The lack  of the  r u r a l  farmers'  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e i r  water pro jec t  
seems t o  be r e l a t e d  t o  t h e i r  mental outlook or  a t t i t u d e s  toward soc ie ty  i n  
general .  For example, the  major i ty  of the  farmers (over  70 percent  i n  
both p ro jec t  and non-project a r e a s )  f e e l  t h a t  these  days a  person doesn ' t  
r e a l l y  know whom he can count on. Likewise, the  same proport ion of the  
r u r a l  people be l ieve  t h a t  success i n  business and p o l i t i c s  cannot be 
e a s i l y  achieved without taking advantage of g u l l i b l e  people. Furthermore, 
the  major i ty  of them f e e l  t h a t  public  o f f i c i a l s  cannot be t rus t ed  or  t h a t  
t h e  world i s  run by a  few powerful persons. I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  t h i s  kind of 
negat ive o r  pes s imis t i c  mental outlook is more prevalent  among women than 
male respondents. The sense of powerlessness, d i s t r u s t ,  and confusion i s  
o f t en  found t o  be more prevalent  among females than males i n  o t h e r  
developing s o c i e t i e s .  This i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  where the  whole soc ie ty  
experiences rap id  s o c i a l  change caused by i n t e r n a l  o r  ex te rna l  forces.  A s  
mentioned e a r l i e r ,  Korea has r ecen t ly  experienced rapid urbaniza t ion  and 
industrialization which might have destroyed some of the traditional 
values and norms, yet no new value system has been established suitable to 
the newly industrializing society. When people are caught up in the 
transition period from a traditional social system to a modern society, 
the result is that they often experience a sense of confusion, uncertain- 
ty, powerlessness, and normlessness. Also, many researchers stated that 
this is particularly true among women. In fact, our data show that this 
is the case. For example, when female respondents were asked if they 
agree with the statement, "Women should stay out of politics", almost 
fifty percent of women said yes while about forty percent of males agree 
with it in both project and non-project areas. Consistent with this is 
the finding that more than 50 percent of women agreed with the statement, 
"Men can be trusted more than women", while over 70 percent of males 
believed so. 
Furthermore, we asked the rural farmer how often husbands and wives 
discuss everyday life problems, children's education or occupation, or 
property management and who makes the decisions. The majority of males 
and females said that they discuss these with their spouses quite often, 
yet both agree that the husband is the main decision maker. Thus, it is 
quite clear that the majority of the rural women still maintain a somewaht 
subordinate relationship to their husbands although they witness daily 
that the whole world is changing. Whether it is due to the water project 
or otherwise, recently rural isolation in Korea has been destroyed. Rural 
women are exposed to modern urban life more and more due to better trans- 
portation and mass media. This exposure to urbanism would easily lead 
women to feel deprived or confused and it is no wonder that rural young 
females avoid marriage with future farmers in their village. 
In conclusion, rural Korea is changing and so are rural people. 
Farmers have seen an improvement in their quality of life and social 
environment partly due to the community's developmental projects including 
the water projects and partly due to the spill-over effect of national 
growth. Nevertheless, they seem somewhat confused and dissatisfied with 
their life. As mentioned earlier, the reason for this disenchantment with 
their life may be their rapidly rising expectations. These rising expec- 
tations can be seen in the fact that over seventy percent of the rural 
residents would like to send their children to college. In fact, we found 
out that when farmers get extra income from their farming, they spend it 
first for their children's education. 
Farmers may feel dissatisfied with their overall life conditions and, 
in particular, with the governmental agricultural policy (77 percent 
manifested dissatisfaction with the government's agricultural policy) 
mainly because now they regard urban people as their reference groups. 
Thus, when they compare their lot with urban people's life, they feel 
deprived. In fact, our data indicate that only a few farmers (about 33 
percent in the project areas and 6 percent in non-project arras) would 
like to see their children becoming farmers. This is why they desire to 
send their children to college if they can. However, this finding that 
farmers suffer to some degree dissatisfaction, powerlessness, and 
confusion should not conceal the fact that their objective life conditions 
have improved during the past few years. 
APPENDIX F 
KOREAN AGRICULTURAL PRICING POLICIES 
by 
David I .  Steinberg 
Korean Agricultural Pricing Policies 
Korean government agricultural pricing policies over the past decade 
have been the essential means by which farm income has risen over time to 
equal urban industrial worker income, a rare phenomenon in developing 
countries. Such an emphasis on rural equity has not been a consistent 
policy under all governments. Rather, it was instituted initially as a 
positive inducement to greater production and improved income distribution 
only with the advent of the military government which came to power in 
1961 and implemented better pricing policies a decade later. The high 
prices paid by the government for rice and barley have materially and 
positively affected the well-being of the farmer. They have not, however, 
been without problems. 
Korean agricultural pricing policies have been marked historically by 
fluctuations in the degree to which market forces and government control 
have operated. The U.S. Military Government misunderstood the nature of 
the large rice exports to Japan during World War 11--exports forced on the 
economy by the Japanese war effort to the detriment of the Koreans. Based 
on this misunderstanding and with a predilection towards a free economy, 
the U.S. Military Government withdrew the controlled delivery, pricing, 
and ration system that the Japanese had introduced. The early failure of 
this policy resulted in the reinstitution of compulsory rice collections 
and a ration system. 
This system was continued after the establishment of the Republic of 
Korea. However, this policy failed as well, as the rice support price was 
too low to increase production, and new technology was lacking. In 1949 
the government purchase price was only about 40 percent of production 
costs and about 20 percent of market price. 
Obviously this policy required changes but they were slow in coming, 
because of political and foreign assistance factors discussed below. The 
present policies have their legal genesis in the Grain Management Law of 
February 1950, which was basically reaffirmed in 1963 and again in 1967. 
The present system is a dualistic one, combining an element of government 
intervention and a free market. As in so many other elements of Korean 
life, the government has continuously held the legal power to control 
absolutely the total range of grain production, pricing, storage, sales, 
imports, and exports, although the degree to which this power has been 
exercised has varied greatly. 
Government acquisition of rice is comprised of three elements: taxa- 
tion in kind, direct purchase, and fertilizerfgrain barter. The degree of 
government involvement in purchases has widely varied; in the 1950's it 
was less than 10 percent for rice, but by 1975 it was 50 percent. In that 
latter year, the government purchased 90 percent of the barley marketed. 
These statistics do no reflect total production, for a significant portion 
of production is retained by the farmer for home consumption. 
Under the Syngman Rhee government, the volatile urban dweller was its 
primary internal political consideration, as the Korean War and the re- 
sulting peasant conservatism and the agrarian reform program of 1949 had 
effectively diffused rural unrest. Land ownership of paddy was limited 
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t o  t h r e e  hec tares .  Although some farmers circumvented the  law through 
r e g i s t r a t i o n  under var ious  family members, o v e r a l l  i t  was e f f e c t i v e  i n  
des t roying  massive ma ld i s t r i bu t ion  of r u r a l  income. I f  Korean farmers 
were poor, they were gene ra l ly  a l l  impoverished. Thus, t he  focus of 
government gra in-pr ic ing  polc ies  was t o  keep the  cos t  of r i c e  and ba r l ey  
low f o r  the  urban market a t  the  expense of t h e  farmer. Tangent ia l ly ,  i t  
r e s u l t e d  i n  lowering land purchase payments t o  landlords  by t enan t s  a s  a  
r e s u l t  of the  land purchase programs under land reform. This low-price 
policy--the pauper iza t ion  of t h e  Korean peasantry--was inadve r t en t ly  
a s s i s t e d  by the  U.S. PL 480 program a f t e r  1955. Under PL 480, an average 
of 9  percent  of annual  domestic g r a i n  production was imported f o r  t h e  
1956-60 period. PL 480 i n  t h i s  same period ranged from 64 t o  93  percent  
of such imports. This  proved t o  be a  major d e t e r r e n t  t o  improving 
government p r i c i n g  p o l i c i e s .  Throughout the  Syngman Rhee period 
(1948-60), i n  no year d id  t h e  government purchase p r i c e  equal  t h e  c o s t  of 
production; i n  s i x  of t he  t h i r t e e n  years  t he  purchase p r i ce  was under 50 
percent  of t h e  market pr ice .  I n  1955, f o r  example, t he  farmer l o s t  W571 
per 80 kg. bag of r i c e ,  o r  a  t o t a l  l o s s  t o  a l l  farmers t h a t  year of W1.7 
b i l l i o n .  
The m i l i t a r y  coup of 1961 began t o  c o r r e c t  t he  imbalance, bu t  i t  took 
almost a  decade t o  t ransform it. The f i r s t  e i g h t  years  of m i l i t a r y  r u l e  
was cha rac t e r i zed  by development p o l i c i e s  focused on i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  and 
expor t  promotion. During t h a t  per iod ,  procurement p r i c e s  t o  farmers rose ,  
adequately covering the  c o s t s  of product ion,  but u sua l ly  under t he  market 
pr ice .  Since imports were suppl ied  by the  U.S. without fo re ign  exchange 
c o s t s  t o  t he  government, t he re  was l i t t l e  pressure t o  a l t e r  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  
seemed t o  have worked e f f e c t i v e l y .  i f  not equi tab ly .  
By 1968-69, however, t he  i ncen t ives  f o r  change began t o  be f e l t .  The 
government recognized t h a t  reform was required.  By 1970-71, PL 480 
l e g i s l a t i o n  changed t o  dol lar-repayable loans,  and g r a i n  imports became a 
p o t e n t i a l  d r a i n  on fo re ign  exchange. In  add i t i on ,  t h e r e  were growing 
d i s p a r i t i e s  between urban incomes, expanding r ap id ly  a s  Korea's expor t  
d r i v e  began t o  s h i f t  i n t o  high gear ,  and r u r a l  incomes, which had 
s tagnated  by comparison. The 1971 e l e c t i o n  r e s u l t s  demonstrated t h a t  
enthusiasm f o r  Pres ident  Park was dropping i n  r u r a l  a r e a s  even though 
government mechanisms t o  ensure success  a t  the  p o l l s  i n  such a r e a s  were 
overwhelming. These e l e c t i o n  r e s u l t s  were a  cause of g rea t  concern, and 
lead  d i r e c t l y ,  wi th  the  added f i l l i p  of an excess of cement product ion,  t o  
t he  o r i g i n  of t h e  Sae-maul Movement. 
The Korean Government i n  1969 i n s t i t u t e d  a  two-price r i c e  and b a r l e y  
p r i c i n g  system. That i s ,  t h e r e  were d i f f e r e n t  p r i c e s  f o r  both g r a i n s  paid 
to  t he  farmer and those t h a t  were charged the  urban dweller .  Even 
d iscount ing  the  government's handling c o s t s ,  f o r  every year  s ince  1969 
except one, t h e  government's purchase p r i c e  has exceeded the  c o s t  of r i c e  
t o  the  consumer. In  each year s i n c e  1968, an  even heavier  subsidy was 
provided f o r  t h e  purchaser  of ba r l ey  (during t h i s  per iod t h e  p r i c e  of 
ba r l ey  was between 40-62 percent  of t h e  p r i c e  of r i c e ) .  The government 
even encouraged the  consumption of bar ley ,  forc ing  r e s t a u r a n t s  and h o t e l s  
t o  mix it with r i c e  on va r ious  occasions and exhort ing the  populace t o  a0 
the  same. 
However, as  farmer incomes rose ,  and urban g ra in  pr ices  were kept 
down, the c o s t s  of these subs id ies  had t o  be borne by some element of the  
economy. They were not run a s  d e f i c i t s  i n  the  genera l  government ac- 
counts. Instead,  they were ca r r i ed  a s  an overdraf t  on the  c e n t r a l  bank, 
thus increasing the  money supply which added t o  i n f l a t i o n a r y  pressure. 
These subs id ies  increased the  money supply by 13.3 percent  i n  1972, 20.6 
percent i n  1973, 68.5 percent i n  1974, and 98.2 percent i n  1975. 
Korean government r i c e  and bar ley  pr ic ing  and purchasing p o l i c i e s  
have been products of a  mix of p o l i t i c a l  acumen and i n d u s t r i a l  growth. 
Even under condit ions of r e l a t i v e  i n d u s t r i a l  and export expansion, a  grow- 
ing number of o f f i c i a l s  have begun t o  quest ion the wisdom of t h i s  ap- I 
proach. Now, however, Korea, l i k e  many count r ies ,  i s  i n  a  period of ec- 
onomic stagnation.  I n f l a t i o n ,  the  i n d u s t r i a l  slowdown, and drops i n  ex- 
po r t s  have a f fec ted  the economy ser ious ly .  While there  i s  a continued op- 
t i m i s m  among r u r a l  youth--both Den and women--who seek high education a s  a  
means of access t o  urban employment and t r e k  t o  the  c i t i e s ,  a  steady 
t r i c k l e  of re turn ing  youth has begun a s  fac tory  slowdowns lower urban 
employment. Some Sae-maul r u r a l  f a c t o r i e s  a r e  shut down or  working a t  
lower productivi ty,  
Korea i s  probably enter ing  a period i n  which i n f l a t i o n  w i l l  outpace 
government r i c e  p r i ce  increases. Farmers, when interviewed, perhaps un- 
r e a l i s t i c a l l y  but almost universa l ly  complained about high cos t s  and 
i n s u f f i c i e n t  r i c e  prices.  Having enjoyed comparative well-being i n  the  
pas t  few years ,  t h e i r  concern over l o s s  of purchasing power is natura l .  
They may not be able t o  augment the a g r i c u l t u r a l  t oo l s  of t h e i r  t rade ,  buy 
e l e c t r i c a l  appliances o r  other  amenities of l i f e .  More importantly, they 
f e a r  the  p o t e n t i a l  des t ruc t ion  of t h e i r  hopes fo r  s o c i a l  mobil i ty t h a t  
f i n d s  expression i n  the  ubiquitous concern f o r  enhanced educat ional  op- 
po r tun i t i e s  f o r  t h e i r  chi ldren.  Now, the  unanimous response of farmers i s  
t h a t  they do not want t h e i r  sons t o  be fanners o r  t h e i r  daughters t o  marry 
farmers. One might comment tha t  the  increased p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of farmers i n  
the money economy, h e t t e r  production, and more income through high r i c e  
pr ices  and the  perceived benef i t s  from these changes have i r o n i c a l l y  l ed  
t o  u n r e a l i s t i c  hopes f o r  the  future.  
An unanticipated dilemma has r e su l t ed  from the pos i t ive  r e s u l t s  of 
i r r i g a t i o n ,  high-yielding v a r i e t i e s  of r i c e  and a high support policy. As 
r i c e  production r i s e s  and incomes increase ,  there  i s  a growing unwil- 
l ingness of farmers on i r r i g a t e d  land t o  grow barley a s  a  winter  crop. 
They f ind  i t  economically unprof i tab le ,  some claiming s a l e s  do not cover 
labor c o s t s  alone. This, together  with government slackening of 
purchases, w i l l  lower barley production over the next seve ra l  years ,  a t  
l e a s t  i n  many projec t  areas. 
Korean a g r i c u l t u r a l  pr ic ing  p o l i c i e s  must a l s o  dea l  with wheat, which 
has become an increas ingly  important element of the  urban d i e t ,  and i s  be- 
ginning to  a f f e c t  some r u r a l  a reas  a s  well. Wheat imports have s t e a d i l y  
grown. In 1956-60 they averaged annually 277,300 metric  tons; by 1971-75 
they averaged 1,623,000 metric  tons. Farmers were observed growing some 
wheat, but with l imited success. Wheat imports i n  1975 almost equal led 
na t iona l  barley production, and wheat consumption i s  l i k e l y  t o  grow. 
The Korean government will have to make some difficult decisions 
related to pricing policies of each of its major grains. One can only 
hope that these decisions will not retard the clear progress that the 
farmers of Korea have made over the past decade. 
PL 480 Imports 
($U. S.. Mill ions)  
PL 480 
Grain a s  
To ta l  Grain PL 480 %/Grain 
Imports Grain Imports Imports 
31.2 20.0 64.1% 
20.6 19.2 93.2% 
Tota l  PL 480 
Aid * 
33.0 
19.9 
67.3 
96.8 
61.0 
59.5 
38.0 
44.4 
55.9 
74.8 
61.7 
33.7 
- 
- 
Source: Ban, e t c .  Rural Development. S tudies  on t h e  Moderea t ion  
of  t h e  Republic of Korea; 1945-1975. Cambridge: Harvard 
Univers i ty  Press ,  1980. 
* Includes Cotton, e t c .  
APPENDIX G 
CHANGE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND RURAL PARTICIPATION 
IN KOREA RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
by 
David I. Steinberg 
Change. Local Government, and Rural Participation 
in Korea Rural Development 
The Setting 
A transformation has occurred in rural Korea. The visitor, returning 
after a decade, cannot help but be struck by the changed landscape. 
Barren, brown hills, ubiquitous throughout the peninsula in the past, are 
gone. Korea is verdant; every hill seems reforested in what must be one 
of the major, long-term successful interventions of this type at a 
national level--an investment for future generations. 
Although less obvious, there has been a manicuring of the landscape, 
and intensification of cultivation and land use that is reminiscent of 
Japan. It is evident not only in small, almost urban-size, plots of 
market vegetables, and in the terraced rice and pepper fields that c\imb 
the hills; it is exemplified in the use of plastic--as a greenhouse to 
expand the growing season in this temperate climate, and as a weed sur- 
pressant and moisture retainer on numberless pepper and vegetable plots 
throughout the country. 
Housing has been rebuilt. Thatch roofs are a rarity; bright red and 
blue tiles are common, sometimes new tin coverings are camouflaged with 
these colors. The traditional U- or L-shaped Korean house has often given 
way to modernistic westernized homes, a bastardization of modern and 
rococo, supplied in various standard models by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs. Occasionally, along a street or road, one sees a new anonymous 
facade masking a traditional home, often of some dignity. What rural 
Koreans may have gained in comfort they have lost in aesthetics. 
Mechanization is everywhere. Hand tillers and mechanical threshers 
are seen in the fields, and now it is the cattle-pulled plow that is more 
a cause for comment. Television is almost as prevalent as in the United 
States. Fans cool in the hot, humid Korean summer. The electric rice 
cooker saves the housewife untold houra every year. Refrigerators are no 
longer an oddity. 
Fifteen years ago Korea had few rural paved roads. Even most major 
highways were enshrouded in clouds of dust. Now a network of paved roads 
criss-crosses rural areas, and bus traffic and truck services have been 
extended into the rural hinterland. Goods of all description are in rural 
market towns. People are better dressed; bicycles take children (boys if 
not girls--for there is clear discrimination here) to middle and high 
schools where in the past, if they went at all, they had to walk. 
Previous Page Blank 
These changes illustrate that Korean farmers are perhaps unique among 
the rural population of developing nations--their incomes equal those of 
the urban industrial work force. This is a far cry from the spring months 
of hardship before the crops were in and winter stocks were depleted that 
farmers experienced not too many years ago. Yet these remarkable develop- 
ments have taken place in an atmosphere substantially different from that 
which the textbooks on rural development popularize. 
That atmosphere is a product of a bureaucratic milieu that pervades 
Korean development efforts in rural areas. It 's one that is strongly 
hierarchical in nature, consciously drawing on the Confucian virtues of 
paternalism and respect for authority, and espousing ideological con- 
formity. On the surface it is a configuration that seems little suited to 
the ethos of rural development as a participatory experience. It has been 
heavy-handed and autocratic. Yet without question change has taken place, 
and although farmers may grumble, they are quick to articulate the overall 
benefits they have received while treating mobilization efforts with con- 
siderable scepticism. 
Rural Administration 
Korea is a highly centralized state that has not permitted the auton- 
omous growth of local representation, local leadership, or pluralistic 
centers of power divorced from the central authority. In spite of diverse 
ministerial functions that extend down to rural areas at the gun (county) 
level, the heart of local administration, real power is vested in the 
Ministry of Home Affairs. It is this ministry that manages the dual 
responsibilities of coercion: the police and local administration. It 
coordinates all activities, and has appointive functions, as in agricul- 
ture, and managerial responsibilities, such as in health. No other 
ministry in Korea has such broad responsibilities nor such capacity to 
influence rural activities. 
Rural Korea is divided into nine provinces, each of which has a 
governor appointed by the central government. There are no elections for 
local offices. The provinces are subdivided into 140 gun, which in turn 
are divided into 1,382 myon, or townships. The gunsu (county chief) and 
the myonchang (township head) are all appointed by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs. 
The county is the nexus of rural development. Officials from other 
agencies, such as those of the Ministry of Agriculture (the Agricultural 
Development Corporation, the cooperatives, etc.) all coordinate their 
functions through the county chief. Overall targets for rural development 
are set by the center and programmed through the county chief, who ensures 
that such goals are met. Some local initiative within nationally doter- 
mined guidelines is possible. The county does prepare annual budgets for 
the provincial administration based on national plans. However, only a 
very small amount of money is available for locally suggested development 
programs. Eighty percent of county funds are provided by the center. 
Major initiatives emanate from Seoul. 
In addition to the county government, and its extension--the township 
officials--there are four organizations on which villagers participating 
in irrigation systems depend. These are: the guidance extension service 
of the Ministry of Agriculture, the local branch of the National 
Agricultural Cooperative Federation, the Sae-maul Movement (New Community 
Movement), and the Farm Land Improvement Association (FLIA--irrigation 
association). These organizations, under the leadership of the county 
chief, control the supply of agricultural commodities and technical 
assistance. They purchase and store selected grains, provide credit, 
manage water and set water rates, and determine social and economic 
targets for improvement in homes and fields. They mobilize both men and 
women, even attempting to instill ideological conformity. 
Farmers' initial voluntary participation in these efforts is, in 
fact, a fiction. They are required to become involved in each of these 
activities, and have little or no say in their operation, except as their 
personal prestige can sometimes gain favor for their particular interests. 
That is not to say that farmers, generally pragmatic in approach, do not 
use centrally controlled systems for their improvement, nor does this mean 
that they may not eventually value their association with them. Farmers 
often employ them with alacrity, but the initial project initiative has 
generally been a product of national planning. Local participation has 
become a fact, but ex-post facto. 
The Office of Rural Development (ORD), a largely autonomous 
organization within the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (in 1973 
renamed the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries) was established in 1962 
by the Park government with the assistance of A.I.D. Under it, at each 
county and in some townships are located the rural guidance offices that 
are devoted to the development of food reserves, improving farm income, 
and demonstration, technical assistance, and training. Unfortunately, the 
guidance service has little material to offer the farmer except advice, 
although such advice in an authoritarian system contains elements of 
command. Its influence is widespread and in contrast to many other 
societies, the extension workers do get out into most of the villages in 
their domain. 
The National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF) has a central 
office in Seoul, nine provincial and 140 county offices, about 1,545 
primary cooperatives and some 145 special cooperatives, with a total of 
some 2,080,000 members, representing between one-fifth and one-quarter of 
the nation's families, or perhaps half of farm families. The NACF is 
charged with increasing agricultural productivity and improving rural 
life, objectives similar to those of the ORD and the Sae-maul Movement. 
Of particular importance is the NACF role in supplying credit, for which 
there is a great demand. The NACF also sells machinery and commodities 
and stores agricultural produce. Their warehouses with their distinctive 
logo seem everywhere--their construction was supported by A.I.D. The NACF 
also assists in marketing. 
The New Community Movement (Sae-maul Undong - lit., new village move- 
ment) was an attempt begun in 1971-72 ,to improve the lot of the farmer 
after President Park had found that his support in rural areas had materi- 
ally eroded in the election of 1971. In the first decade after the forma- 
tion of the military government in 1961, an urban-based industrialization 
and export policy had been fostered with a rapid decline in rural living 
standards relative to those in urban Korea. The Sae-maul Movement was 
born of a political desire to generate rural support for the regime. It 
coincided with an excess of cement production in 1971. This felicitous 
combination resulted in 300 bags of cement to each village in the country 
for community projects. Because of presidential interest, the movement 
has been characterized by great vigor and bureaucratic elan. Attention 
has been concentrated on activities similar to those associated with the 
community development efforts, supported by A.I.D., in Korea in the 
1950's. With new central backing, however, it has had a marked impact in 
contrast to previous attempts at rural transformation. It has achieved 
these results not without a substantial, and required, investment of 
farmer labor, time, and money, with returns sometimes delayed well into 
the future. However, as it has been noted (Ban, Moon, and Perkins, 1980, 
p. 278), "There is no doubt that the NCM (New Community ~ovement) has 
speeded up the pace of social and economic change in rural areas." 
The Sae-maul Movement has been ubiquitous. It reached to every part 
of the country. Government-sponsored, it has generated an enormous amount 
of self-help, both in terms of voluntary labor and in donated funds. The 
distinction in rural Korea, with the !-tinistry of Home Affairs controlling 
both police and administration, between voluntary and corvee labor, and 
donations and extortion is not clear. If physical coercion was not used, 
then a heterogeneous combination of peer pressure, shame, self-interest, 
and subtle control over access to farm commodities and credit probably 
were. 
During 1978 alone, 36,000 villages had some form of Sae-maul 
activity, with Won 634 billion used from private and public sources, and 
271 million mandays of labor "voluntarily" donated. From 1971-78, Won 
2,000 billion was invested for Sae-maul projects, of which only 22 percent 
was government-generated. The IBRD has also supported Sae-maul projects. 
Project emphasis has shifted over time. Cement was provided for 
roads and bridges. Tin was available for roofing, replacing thatch, a 
change of marginal economic utility but one that the government hoped 
would make farmers feel more modern, and make the populace believe Korea 
was progressing. Since 1975, activities have focused on improving farm 
household income and more recently on rural housing. Whole villages in 
some cases, individual houses in others, have rebuilt their houses in new, 
modern design. Standard blueprints are provided by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, with a 25 year loan provided at low interest with a five year 
grace period. Rural Korea may have gained in comfort what it has lost in 
tradition and aesthetics. Now, as Korea enters a recession, loans have 
begun to come due. What seemed like easy money in a period of prosperity 
may become difficult to repay in times of adversity. 
The Sae-maul Movement has fostered the growth of industry in rural 
areas. From 1973-77, about 500 Sae-maul factories have been operating, 
although about 40 percent have been underutilized. These factories 
employed about 151,000 man-years of labor, and exported $438 million in 
goods--about 2 percent of total exports during that period. Eight hundred 
fifty thousand rural people have been trained in some sort of vocational 
skill under the movement. Visual evidence indicates that these factories, 
in ~ r a l  areas with increased transport costs, may not be able to 
withstand even a modest recession. It is likely that rural manufacturing 
under the Sae-maul program may falter. 
Korean sources recognize the need to change from forced to real local 
participation in the future. One noted: 
Voluntary participation of the people in planning and implemen- 
tation of Sae-maul projects should be promoted for their maximum 
comitment and contribution to the success of Sae-maul Undong. 
The current tendency of forced modernization by government 
apparatus should not be continued to work in view of social and 
political context of rural communities in the 1980's. 
Korean government investment has dropped in the past several years 
and, given the economic stringency that Korea currently faces, further 
large-scale government investment may lag. If so, will current Korean 
dissatisfaction with military authorities translate into a reluctance to 
voluntarily contribute to See-maul projects? The answer is unclear. 
The Sae-maul movement has been supplemented with the Sae-maum ("New 
Heart" or "New ~ind") Movement. It's object is to instill Confucian 
ideology, conformity, and foster values such as loyalty to the state, 
filial piety, and a work ethic that those acquainted with Korea would 
think already existed. It is a movement that has been used to find a 
positive focus for anti-communist ideology and justify authoritarian 
control. Its slogans, sometimes carved in stone at considerable expense, 
are widespread, yet skeptics doubt that it will change attitudes. It is 
reminiscent of the Kuomontang-sponsored "New Life Movement" in China in 
the 1930's. It may have as ephemeral an effect. 
The Farn Land Improvement Association (FLIA) is the mechanism through 
which farmers band together to handle irrigation. There are 123 FLIAs 
throughout the country. The functions of these organizations are water 
control and construction of irrigation and drainage systems and mainten- 
ance. The officers in charge of the FLIAs are appointed by the govern- 
ment; the FLIAs larger than 5,000 hectares are centrally appointed, and 
those of less than 5.000 hectares chosen by provincial governors. Each 
FLIA table or organization is determined by government. Ditch tenders are 
appointed on a seasonal basis, each controlling the distribution of water 
to an average of 50 hectares. Some inequities in water distribution have 
been noted in time of drought. FLIAS require year-round maintenance 
and operat ion expenses, but farmers pay water c o s t s  to  the FLIA only a f t e r  
harves t ,  thus forc ing the FLIA t o  borrow from banks a t  the high com- 
mercial i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  a  burden passed on t o  the farmer through higher 
water fees. 
Because of the  nature of i r r i g a t i o n  systems, and because the choice 
of such systems i s  made c e n t r a l l y ,  farmers seem t o  have l i t t l e  t o  say i n  
t h e i r  operat ion nor can they demure from p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  them. They 
cannot change from paddy production t o  any o ther  crop or  take land out of 
production f o r  non-agricultural  use without governmental approval. To 
c a l l  t h e  FLIA a type of cooperative is cant.  It i s  a c e n t r a l l y  con- 
t r o l l e d  mechanism t o  e x t r a c t  payment f o r  water del ivered.  It funct ions  
well on engineering and const ruct ion ,  but it i s  not a  product of consensu- 
a l  choice. Vi l l age r s  have no idea of how the charges a re  ca lcula ted .  
Even a t  the  l o c a l  l e v e l ,  the well-being of t h e  v i l l a g e r s  seems beyond 
bureaucra t ic  ken. 
With l o c a l  e l e c t i o n s  s t i l l  a  r a the r  dim v i s ion  among some p o l i t i c a l  
th inkers  i n  Korea, and with major cont ro l  i n  the hands of the Ministry of 
Home A f f a i r s ,  t he re  i s  l i t t l e  l ike l ihood t h a t  farmer p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  a  
more e g a l i t a r i a n  and autonomous r u r a l  s t r u c t u r e  w i l l  evolve i n  the near 
term. The bureaucrat ic  system a l s o  re in fo rces  and is reinforced by the 
h ie ra rch ica l  s t r u c t u r e  of Korean socie ty ,  i n  which important d i s t i n c t i o n s  
a r e  made on the bas i s  of yangban (gentry)  and commoner s t a t u s ,  c lan ,  edu- 
ca t ion ,  and o f f i c i a l  rank. Farmer pa r t i c ipa t ion  i s ,  therefore ,  an element 
of improvement i n  Korea t h a t  is  not l i k e l y  to  occur readi ly .  
The Model? 
The v i s i b l e  s igns  of development a r e  everywhere, although poverty, 
and i n  some places severe poverty, ex i s t s .  Progress i s  being made i n  
remote a reas ,  i n  s p i t e  of the  farmer i n  one such v i l l a g e  who answered a 
quest ion about Sae-maul a c t i v i t y  i n  h i s  v i l l a g e  by remarking, "Why should 
the re  be? We a r e  not along a highway?" 
Korea has progressed i n  her i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  and export promotion, 
although the  human pr ice  paid fo r  t h i s  growth--a generat ion of underpaid 
men and especia l ly  women--is too of ten  overlooked. I t  has been discussed 
widely, many c a l l i n g  i t  a success s tory .  There i s  a l s o  a tendency t o  re- 
gard Korea's r u r a l  development a s  an export model tha t  may be su i t ed  t o  
other  soc ie t i e s .  This is an a t t i t u d e  o f f i c i a l l y  fos tered  i n  Korea. To 
what extent  i s  t h i s  j u s t i f i e d ?  
Korea has had severa l  na t iona l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h a t ,  together ,  form a 
unique pat tern  t h a t  i s  not repl icable .  Korea i s  the only e t h n i c a l l y  homo- 
geneous nat ion on the  Asian continent ,  it has a  s trong Confucian t r a d i t i o n  
with i t s  concomittant s t r e s s  on education, a t ra ined and responsive 
bureaucracy, a  s t rong h i e r a r c h i c a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  and a sense of pragmatism 
unfe t tered  by strong t r a d i t i o n a l  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s  t h a t  might impede 
change. 
The lack of divisive ethnic groups, and thus the potential for closer 
bonds between the bureaucracy and the rural people than in more ethnically 
heterogeneous societies, is a major advantage that the states of South and 
Southeast Asia and Africa lack. Confucianism has given the Korean a sense 
of a stable world order at the micro-level, where the roles of all are 
understood, not only between family members, but within the village and 
between the village and local administration. The Confucian stress on 
education has meant that there is a desire for it as an end, but more 
importantly as an avenue of social mobility. The vigor and competence of 
the bureaucracy are apparent, although it can be a two-edged sword. The 
Korean bureaucracy, like many, tends to be more responsive to its upper 
reaches than to its clients in the villages. 
Korea has followed an authoritarian path to rural development. It 
has made marked changes, but those who might argue that this is the only 
way for progress, those who deny the possibility of growth with partici- 
pation, are advocating a self-fulfilling prophecy. Stating that Korea 
needed strong authoritarian leadership at the local level because a more 
pluralistic approach would fail is a weak case, for it was not tried in 
the Korean context. 
Korean rural development has had a profound influence in the vil- 
lages. The country-side d l 1  never be the same. It is not necessarily, 
however, an administrative model for other societies to emulate. 
APPENDIX H 
DONOR EXPERIENCE I N  IRRIGATION I N  KOREA: THE IBRD EXAMPLE 
by 
D a v i d  I .  Steinberg 
Donor Experience in Irrigation Projects in Korea: The IBRD Examples 
A large number of projects that relate to irrigation have been 
supported by foreign donors in Korea. Some of these have been major 
multipurpose dam and hydroelectric projects and major river basin 
development. However, two projects supported by the IBRD may be relevant 
to the A.I.D. experience. Both have been completed, and both evaluated by 
the IBRD and Korean academicians. These are: 1 )  the Pyongtaek-Kumgang 
Irrigation project, with a Bank investment of $45 million, and additional 
$13.02 million having been added later due to an exchange rate adjustment; 
and 2 )  Yong San Gang Irrigation project, with Bank funds of $33 million in 
loans, and an additional $15 million in credits. 
The Pyongtaek-Kumgang project agreement was signed in May 1969 and 
its estimated completion data was December 1976.  Because of inflation and 
exchange rate changes, the project had a cost overrun of 45 percent, and a 
time overrun of 46 percent. The economic rate of return had initially 
been calculated at 14 percent, and on completion this figure turned out to 
be accurate because of rising rice prices and yield increase which ex- 
ceeded original estimates. 
The project irrigated 2 7 , 7 3 0  hectares ( 3 5 , 1 9 0  were planned) on the 
West Coast, and was administered by the Agriculture Development Cor- 
poration (ADC). Two estuary dams were constructed, and reclaimed tidal 
land. The IBRD rated the performance of the ADC as "outstanding." The 
ADC, under the Rural Modernization Promotion Law of December 1969 ,  was 
created by merging the Groundwater Development Corporation and the Union 
of Land Improvement Associations (ULIA). 
Problems encountered included the design and construction of the es- 
tuary dams, difficulties of irrigating upland, and the relatively high 
cost of land consolidation. 
The original design of the project did not calculate increased re- 
turns from th6 high-yielding varieties, which were just being introduced 
at that time. Farmer acceptance of these strains was unclear. Original 
estimates for yields in 1969 were 2.0 tons of rice per hectare, and 1.5 
tons of barley. The expected return was 4.0 tons of rice and 2.5 tons of 
barley. However, these figures were underestimated, so that yields are 
now expected to be 4 .9  tons of rice per hectare, and 2 .8  tons of barley. 
Because of the tight turnaround time for double-cropping barley and 
rice, tractors were purchased to speed the transition time. Cropping 
intensities (barley) are expected to increase from 5 percent to 45 percent 
in one area of the project, and from 20 percent to 70 percent in the other 
area. With some farmer dissatisfaction with barley or perhaps more ac- 
curately, with increased reliance on rice, it might be worthwhile to see 
if this high level of double-cropping is sustained. It has not been 
maintained in the A.1.D.-supported projects. 
After completion of the project irrigation systems, responsibility 
for their operation and miantenance was transferred to the Farm Land 
Improvement Associations (FLIA); in turn they subdivided into farmer 
groups that manage about 50 hectares and are also the contact point for 
extension agents and the collection of water charges. 
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The loan agreement s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  t h e  ROK agree t o  levy water  
charges t o  cover a l l  operat ion and maintenance c o s t s  and 40 percent  of 
c a p i t a l  cos ts .  Under t h e  Land Improvement Law of 1969, t h e  ROK subs id i zes  
60 percent of i r r i g a t i o n  pro jec ts .  This was r a i sed  i n  1970 t o  70 percent.  
Costs t o  the  farmer run about $170 per hec tare  per year ,  o r  12 percent of 
"average incremental a g r i c u l t u r a l  income." Col lec t ion  r a t e s  a r e  a s  high 
a s  96 percent. 
Farm income, based upon 1978 p r i c e s ,  would have been W767,OOO before  
t h e  p ro jec t ,  W886,000 without the p ro jec t  due t o  normal y i e l d  and p r i ce  
increases ,  and W1,330,000 a t  f u l l  development, " r e f l e c t i n g  an incremental 
increase  of 50 percent." Farm income before the p ro jec t  was 50 percent  of 
the  n a t i o n a l  average, but by 1975 it was 25 percent above t h e  n a t i o n a l  
average farm income. 
The Yong San Gang pro jec t  agreement was signed i n  February 1972, and 
the  p ro jec t  completed i n  December 1978. There was a c o s t  overrun of 95 
percent and a 50 percent  time overrun. The economic r a t e  of r e t u r n  was 
ca l cu la t ed  t o  be 13  percent.  The pro jec t  i r r i g a t e d  32,300 hec tares .  
A t  the  time of p ro jec t  design,  rain-fed y i e lds  were 2.4 tons pe r  
hec ta re  of mil led r i c e ,  and i t  was expected t h a t  t h i s  would r i s e  t o  4.2 
tons per hectare.  Since the  high-yielding v a r i e t i e s  have been introduced,  
rain-fed y i e l d s  average 3.2 tons  per hec ta re ,  and i r r i g a t e d  y i e l d s  5 tons  
per hectare.  Water charges a r e  being paid a t  a 97 percent c o l l e c t i o n  r a t e  
t o  the Yong San Gang Farm Land Improvement Associat ion,  under which dis-  
t r i b u t i o n  of water i s  c a r r i e d  out by over 375 farmers'  "cooperatives" 
(Hung Nong Gae). 
Farmers hold an average of 0.9 hec ta re s ,  with the  range between 0.5 
and 2.0 hectares .  I n  1971 p r i ces ,  per c a p i t a  income was pro jec ted  t o  
increase  from $85 t o  $180. Rice y i e lds  a r e  expected t o  be 5.4 tons  per  
hec tare ,  and ba r l ey  3.0 tons. Barley i n t e n s i t y  i s  expected t o  inc rease  
from 60 percent  t o  70 percent.  Farmer repayment i n  1971 p r i c e s  was es- 
t imated t o  be $90 per hec ta re ,  o r  betweeen 16 percent and 21 percent  of 
incremental farm income a t  f u l l  development. By 1978 charges per hec tare  
were $132 per year. A t  f u l l  development these  charges, inc luding  c a p i t a l  
repayment, w i l l  be $178 per  hec tare  per year ,  o r  about 7 percent  of es- 
t imated farm income. The pro jec t  w i l l  increase  farm income by 30 percent  
( f a l l i n g . s h o r t  of the  projected 50 percent  i nc rease ) ,  but  t h e  absolu te  
l e v e l s  a n t i c i p a t e d  w i l l  have been reached. This was due t o  the  un- 
a n t i c i p a t e d  e a r l y  use of the  high-yielding v a r i e t i e s .  Per c a p i t a  farm 
income i s  expected t o  be $434. The poverty l e v e l  i n  Korea i n  1978 was 
$270. 
The ROK-IBRD investments i n  i r r i g a t i o n  f o r  these p r o j e c t s  a r e  a small  
proport ion of the  Won 276 b i l l i o n  invested on i r r i g a t i o n  from 1962 -1978 
t o  r a i s e  i r r i g a t e d  hectarage from 682,000 t o  1,122,000 during t h a t  time. 
I n  f a c t ,  t h e  i r r i g a t e d  paddy area  r a t i o  increased from 56 percent t o  85.5 
percent  during the  same period. There were over 69,000 small  farmer-run 
i r r i g a t i o n  systems by 1978, of which 9,940 systems a r e  operated by t h e  
Farm Land Improvement Associat ion (FLIA). In  add i t ion  t o  A.I.D. and IBRD 
funding, t h e  ADB, FAO, and OECF a l s o  cont r ibuted  to  t h i s  development. 
In  a Korean-conducted survey of small  IBRD i r r i g a t i o n  p r o j e c t s ,  
farmers (26 percent )  i nd ica t ed  t h a t  land consol ida t ion  should come 
together with irrigation, 17 percent said that farm mechanization was 
necessary because of labor shortages, and about 22 percent said they had 
problems with drainage. The internal rates of return on small IBRD pump 
and gravity systems was 12.41 percent at international prices, and 16.60 
percent at domestic prices. In general, pumping systems yielded a higher 
rate of return (17 percent to 9.5 percent) because of the added costs and 
construction time for gravity systems. Average costs to develop one 
hectare of irrigated paddy was Won 1,750,000. Benefit-cost ratios indi- 
cated that all studied projects were economically feasible using a 3.5 
percent discount rate. However, when a 10 percent discount rate was used, 
one-half of the projects were not economically feasible. Reservoir pro- 
jects are particularly vulnerable with current construction costs, lead 
times, and world rice prices. 
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Appendix I 
Korean S t a t i s t i c s  Related t o  Agricul ture 6 Rural Income 
Fann Household Income 1963 1965 1969 1971 1974 1975 1976 1977 1979 1980 
Per cap i t a  farm income* 
Current Won (000) per year 
Index of p r i c e s  received by 6 paid 
by farmers (1970-100) 
Grain p r i ces  received by fanners 
P r i ces  paid by fanners  
Consumer P r i ce  Index 
Wholesale P r i ce  Index 
Exchange Rate (Won per US$) 
H 
484.0 484.0 580 I w 
(Jan.) 
* Non-agricultural farm household income was i n  1975 18.1% of t o t a l  farm household income and i n  1977 i t  was 27.7%. 
Agricul ture a s  a percentage of na t iona l  income Employment i n  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r e  & f o r e s t r y  sec to r  
1961 35.6% 1963 4,644,000 60.6% 
1971 24.2% 1970 4,826,000 49.52 
1977 19.2X 1975 5,123,000 43.3% 
1978 16.6% 
mth.a-- 1978 4,920,000 36.5% 
Sample Farm Households Cult ivated area (000 pyong) Current P n n  Income &&n conpump- 
won 
Family Size Farm Workers Tota l  Paddy 
1965 6.29 3.15 2,878.33 1,824.96 112.201 3,770.54 
1974 5.66 2.86 2,900.18 1,693.54 674,451 3,234.10 
1977 5.52 2.74 3,001.36 1,859.86 1,432,809 3.800.00 
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Korea 
Self-sufficiency Ratio of Rice, Barley, and Wheat 
(Percentage by Harvest Year) 
Year 
-
1961 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
Source: 
Rice 
-
Barley Wheat 
99.5 95.5 33.9 
94.3 98.7 15.7 
81 .O 95.6 15.1 
93.1 106.3 15.4 
82.5 91.8 10.7 
91.6 93.2 7.4 
92.6 82.9 4.8 
90.8 78.4 5.0 
100.5 100.8 5.5 
103.6 102.9 4.5 
108.6 48.5 2.3 
103.8 119.9 2.1 
86.0 117.0 2.4 
EPB Handbook of Korean Economy 
Production and Imports of Rice and Barley 
Rice Imports 
000 MT Value Mission $ 
Barley Imports 
000 MT Value Million $ 
Production (000 M T l  
Rice Barley 
-
Government Rice and Barley Pricing and Purchases 
Rice 
Purchasing 
Ratio 
(1970=100) 
Year 
-
Rice Govt . 
Output Rice 
Index Purchases 
(1970=100) A s  % of crop 
94.7 8.3% 
101.5 12.6% 
100.5 12.8% 
106.9 11.6% 
112.8 16.8% 
118.6 17.2% 
132.4 20.0% 
152.5 23.4% 
147.2 23.4% 
141.3 23.4% 
Barley 
Purchasing 
Ratio 
(1970=100) 
Irrigation 
(000 Hectares) 
Total Paddy Irrigated 
Fert i l izer  Consumption 
1961 308,494 Metric tons 
1971 605,137 " 11 
1975 886,208 " (1 
1978 916,000 " I, 
1979 914,000 " 8 ,  
Power Ti l l er  
(Number) 
Barley 
Output 
Index 
(1970=100) 
68.2 
93.2 
95.5 
84.7 
81.4 
99.2 
106.4 
45.9 
83.2 
87.5 
Part ia l ly  
Irrigated 
Govt . 
Barley 
Purchases 
A s  % of crop 
3.8% 
7.9% 
16.6% 
19.1% 
22.4% 
28.8% 
32.4% 
23.3% 
35.9% 
37.1% 
Rainf ed 
Rice Production Costs and Sale Prices 
(Won per 80 Kg.) 
Govt. Purchase Cost of Market 
Price Production Price 
1959 1,059 1,300 1,368 
1961 1,550 1,377 1,768 
1965 3,150 2,672 3,419 
Purchase Price 
As % of 
Production Cost 
81.4% 
112.6% 
117.9% 
123.4% 
144.5% 
150.8% 
186.9% 
161.7% 
173.0% 
198.0% 
APPENDIX J 
IRRIGATION SITE VISITS 
Appendix J 
Irrigation Site Visits 
Irrigation Site 
Gun-am ( % 
Goon-pyong ( 4 +? 
Keum-dong ( @ & 
San-nam ( 3C\ \P1 
Mae-ho ( $&?$I 
Chang-woon ( 3 @, 
Ha-nam ( 7 M 
Jang-yoo ( % f i  
Yoon-nae ( $@ \$q 
Myung-kwan ( $(, @@ 
13.  an-kyung-gang ' ( ,%f& ,, 
14. Se-do ( &\% L ) South Chungchong R'Kk EL 
15. Yeo-ju (s&y ) Kyunggi 
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APPENDIX L 
PHOTOGRAPHS 
With A.I.D. funds, the Government of Korea has 
construcled pumplng systems lor irr igation 
throughout the country. EWost designs are similar to 
this one at Goang-pyong, ten mile% from the North- This carnor'lagued system is in the south, along the 
South Korean border. Maktong River, where there is less of a threat, 
Inside, irrigation pumps are well main rained, 
and are q i~ i te  sophisticated in design and 
use. 
This care is extended to the aquaducts, often carrying irrigation water long distances via elevated networks. 
L-2 
Here, in South Cholla Province, a reservoir system constructed with A.I.D funds is the basis for the gravityflow of water for the irrigation canals. Photo on right is a valley irrigated by one such system pictured during
the mid period of a rice-growing season.
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Womtrfrteiriaincnl.
is n iytmprtatueleedurn 
thetheirphouseholdadutiesrwomen doamost 
traditionalmanner, oftenI rigatio  can ls also serve as washing points for village women.
with assistance from the younger members of the community. Heavy useThis chore Isstill performedin ofpesticides and fertilizers may cause health hazards.	 the 4P 	 7 
. .... . .
 .. ..,,t, , .Womens' laboris an importantelement 
', . ..
.- ,.,b.' " 
 'In the village economy. In addition to 
<., theirhouseholdduties, women do most 
.	 of the transplanting, much of theharvesting 
- and receive less pay than 
their male counterparts. 
CIndec the Satbmaul program, Korean 
homes have been given nor%-bunction6i.l 
facelr'fts, moderized homes have been 
constructed, and, sometimes, whole 
communities have Been rebuilt. At right, 
a traditional Korean house. Alfhough 
poor, the tamily stiff has a television 
set, 
Soon it may be diffkuft to say whether 
t rad i t i ona l  commun i t i es  are 
interspersed with modern e9ements or 
vice versa. Wllagers gather at the 
See-mad-conslruetsd meeting hause. 
Note the thatched roof on the strucfure 
next door. 
L-4 
Farmers still carry crops and fertilizers to and from the fields on the A-frame, a mode of conveyance over1,500 years old. Note the tiller in the background of the photo on right. 
While tillers, too, are used to transport
crops, here a tiller en7ine has beenmounted on a chassis. Carrying alocally constructed tank containing ,, ;makkoli, or rice beer, a village
entrepreneur will deliver 5 gallons to thehome for $2.50. 
Certainly,a healthy indicatorfor the ;uturehas been the disappearanceof skin disease,once so prevalentin
rural Korea. 
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